NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE AND

country-of-origin labeling law (COOL) violates U.S. obligations under WTO rules WT/DS384/R WT/DS386/R

2011-11-18T12:55:00.000-08:00

country-of-origin labeling law (COOL) violates U.S. obligations under WTO rules WT/DS384/R WT/DS386/R

WT/DS384/R

WT/DS386/R

Page 213

VIII. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 We recall the United States' request that we issue our findings in the form of a single document containing two separate reports with separate findings and recommendations for each complainant. We also recall that Canada agreed, and Mexico did not object, to the United States' request.1134 Accordingly, we provide two separate sets of findings and recommendations, with separate numbers/symbols for each complainant (WT/DS384 for Canada and WT/DS386 for Mexico).

1134 See para. 2.11 above.

WT/DS384/R

Page 214A

A. COMPLAINT BY CANADA (DS384): FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

8.2 Canada has made claims with regard to the COOL measure and the Vilsack letter under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and Articles III:4, X:3(a) and XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.

8.3 With respect to Canada's claims under the TBT Agreement, we conclude that:

(a) the COOL measure is a "technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement, whereas the Vilsack letter is not;

(b) the COOL measure, particularly in regard to the muscle cut meat labels, violates Article 2.1 because it affords imported livestock treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic livestock; and

(c) the COOL measure violates Article 2.2 because it does not fulfil the objective of providing consumer information on origin with respect to meat products.

8.4 With respect to Canada's claims under the GATT 1994, we conclude that:

(a) we need not make a finding on the COOL measure under Article III:4 in light of our finding that the same measure violated the national treatment obligation under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement;

(b) the Vilsack letter violates Article X:3(a) because it does not constitute a reasonable administration of the COOL measure; and

(c) having found that the Vilsack letter falls within the scope of Article X:3(a), we refrain from examining whether it is inconsistent with Article III:4.

8.5 Finally, in light of the above findings of violation, we have refrained from examining Canada's non-violation claim under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.

8.6 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent that the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, it has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Canada under these agreements.

8.7 Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, having found that the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, we recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United States to bring the inconsistent measures into conformity with its obligations under the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994.

_______________

WT/DS386/R

Page 214B

A. COMPLAINT BY MEXICO (DS386): FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

8.2 Mexico has made claims with regard to the COOL measure and the Vilsack letter under Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 12.1 and 12.3 of the TBT Agreement and Articles III:4, X:3(a) and XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.

8.3 With respect to Mexico's claims under the TBT Agreement, we conclude that:

(a) the COOL measure is a "technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement, whereas the Vilsack letter is not;

(b) the COOL measure, in particular in regard to the muscle cut meat labels, violates Article 2.1 because it affords imported livestock treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic livestock;

(c) the COOL measure violates Article 2.2 because it does not fulfil the objective of providing consumer information on origin with respect to meat products;

(d) Mexico has not established that the COOL measure violates Article 2.4;

(e) Mexico has not established that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 12.3; and

(f) in light of our finding on Mexico's claim under Article 12.3, Mexico has not established its claim under Article 12.1.

8.4 With respect to Mexico's claims under the GATT 1994, we conclude that:

(a) we need not make a finding on the COOL measure under Article III:4 in light of our finding of violation by the same measure of the more specific national treatment obligation under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement;

(b) the Vilsack letter violates Article X:3(a) because it does not constitute a reasonable administration of the COOL measure;

(c) Mexico has not established that the United States administered the COOL measure in a non-uniform and partial manner inconsistently with Article X:3(a) through the shifts in the guidance by USDA on the COOL measure; and

(d) having found that the Vilsack letter falls within the scope of Article X:3(a), we refrain from examining whether it is inconsistent with Article III:4.

8.5 Finally, in light of the above findings of violation, we have refrained from examining Mexico's non-violation claim under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.

8.6 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent that the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, it has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Mexico under these agreements.

WT/DS386/R

Page 215B

8.7 Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, having found that the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, we recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United States to bring the inconsistent measures into conformity with its obligations under the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994.

_______________

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/384_386r_conc_e.pdf

Thursday, November 17, 2011

International cattle ID and traceability: Competitive implications for the US

Food Policy Volume 37, Issue 1, February 2012, Pages 31-40

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2011/11/international-cattle-id-and.html

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Alternative BSE Risk Assessment Methodology of Imported Beef and Beef Offal to Japan Journal of Veterinary Medical Science

Advance Publication

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/alternative-bse-risk-assessment.html

Sunday, November 13, 2011

California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/california-bse-mad-cow-beef-recall-qfc.html

Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Galveston, Texas - Isle port moves through thousands of heifers headed to Russia, none from Texas, Alabama, or Washington, due to BSE risk factor

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/galveston-texas-isle-port-moves-through.html

MAD COW DISEASE, TEXAS STYLE

http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_23850.cfm

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;

Monday, October 10, 2011

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

snip...

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

snip...

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf

see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE.

In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html

Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee

The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government's decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010

2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf

And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.

full text 18 pages ;

http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf

please see full text ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html

[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:

"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.

http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241545887.pdf

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:

"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.

The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"

http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=20100405.1091

When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

Saturday, March 05, 2011

MAD COW DISEASE BSE PRION MEXICO ???

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-disease-bse-prion-mexico.html

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

Fri Mar 4, 2011 10:05am EST

WINNIPEG, Manitoba (Reuters) - Canadian government officials have found a dairy cow in Alberta with mad cow disease, but the finding is not surprising and shouldn't affect beef exports, a spokesman for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency said on Friday. The agency confirmed the case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE as the disease is also known, on February 18 in a 77-month-old dairy cow, spokesman Guy Gravelle said.

In 2003, the first discovery of a cow in Canada with the disease led to closures of numerous export markets to Canadian beef. Most have reopened, other than South Korea and China, and importers are no longer as sensitive to new cases as countries such as Canada now have monitoring systems in place.

Canada continues to be rated a "controlled risk" for the disease by the World Organization for Animal Health, Gravelle said. The newest case may delay any upgrade to Canada's international risk status as a country cannot apply for negligible status sooner than 11 years after the latest-born case.

The cow has been destroyed and no part of its carcass entered the human food or animal feed systems, Gravelle said.

The case, which is believed to be Canada's 18th, should not affect exports of Canadian cattle or beef, he said, as a small number of BSE cases are expected as Canada monitors for the disease.

(Reporting by Rod Nickel; Editing by Walter Bagley)

http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idCATRE7233JT20110304

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/comenqe.shtml

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/disemala/bseesb/bseesbe.shtml

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Tuesday, November 08, 2011

Can Mortality Data Provide Reliable Indicators for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance? A Study in France from 2000 to 2008 Vol. 37, No. 3-4, 2011

Original Paper

Conclusions:These findings raise doubt about the possibility of a reliable CJD surveillance only based on mortality data.

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/11/can-mortality-data-provide-reliable.html

U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ? (see video at bottom)

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html

2006

USA sporadic CJD cases rising ;

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf

2008

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html

CJD USA RISING, with UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE ;

5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases;

*** 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

Thursday, August 4, 2011

Terry Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis, Date aired: 27 Jun 2011 (SEE VIDEO)

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/terry-singeltary-sr-on-creutzfeldt.html

Sunday, August 21, 2011

The British disease, or a disease gone global, The TSE Prion Disease (SEE VIDEO)

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/british-disease-or-disease-gone-global.html

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

Friday, November 04, 2011

Diagnostic accuracy of cerebrospinal fluid protein markers for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in Canada: a 6-year prospective study Research article

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/11/diagnostic-accuracy-of-cerebrospinal.html

WHO WILL FOLLOW THE CHILDREN FOR CJD SYMPTOMS ???

Saturday, May 2, 2009

U.S. GOVERNMENT SUES WESTLAND/HALLMARK MEAT OVER USDA CERTIFIED DEADSTOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/us-government-sues-westlandhallmark.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/

Sunday, September 6, 2009

MAD COW USA 1997 (see SECRET VIDEO)

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html

U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ? (see video at bottom)

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html

Wednesday, November 09, 2011

Case report Sporadic fatal insomnia in a young woman: A diagnostic challenge: Case Report TEXAS

HOW TO TURN A POTENTIAL MAD COW VICTIM IN THE USA, INTO A HAPPENSTANCE OF BAD LUCK, A SPONTANEOUS MUTATION FROM NOTHING.

OR WAS IT $$$

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/11/case-report-sporadic-fatal-insomnia-in.html

Mad Cow Scaremongers

Mad Cow Scaremongers by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. a review of the TSE prion agent 2003-2011

re-2003

"he also blindly insists upon a mad-cow with Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and Lou Gehrig’s disease."

http://www.seac.gov.uk/pdf/hol-response091008.pdf

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/seac-science-and-technology-committees.html

SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/09/mad-cow-scaremongers.html

layperson

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

flounder9@verizon.net

TSS

International cattle ID and traceability: Competitive implications for the US

2011-11-17T19:59:00.000-08:00

Food Policy Volume 37, Issue 1, February 2012, Pages 31-40

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2011.10.005 | How to Cite or Link Using DOI

International cattle ID and traceability: Competitive implications for the US

Ted C. Schroeder , , Glynn T. Tonsor,

Agricultural Economics, Waters Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, United States

Received 31 December 2010; revised 21 June 2011; Accepted 15 October 2011. Available online 16 November 2011.

Abstract

Global standards for animal identification and traceability are evolving rapidly. Major world animal health, trade, and food safety organizations have formally recognized the importance of, and actively promoted, animal identification and traceability system development. Advanced animal traceability systems have been deployed by major beef exporters and are increasingly being adopted by important beef importing countries. This study summarizes and compares animal identification systems across major export and import countries. Results reveal that the United States lags behind both major export and import countries in development and adoption of cattle identification and tracing systems. As such, the United States has placed itself in a vulnerable position relative to competing export countries with respect to demonstrated animal traceability. This status could adversely affect market access in the future for US beef exports.

Highlights

Cattle identification and traceability is rapidly becoming a global standard.

The United States lags beef export and import countries in cattle tracing systems.

This status could challenge future beef export market access for the United States.

Fig. 1.

US exports of beefs and veal and beef variety meats, 2000–2010. Source: Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics (FATUS).

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919211001229

Keywords: Animal identification; Beef exports; Food safety; Market access; Traceability

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919211001229

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Alternative BSE Risk Assessment Methodology of Imported Beef and Beef Offal to Japan Journal of Veterinary Medical Science

Advance Publication

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/alternative-bse-risk-assessment.html

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

This is an interesting editorial about the Mad Cow Disease debacle, and it's ramifications that will continue to play out for decades to come ;

Monday, October 10, 2011

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

snip...

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

snip...

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf

see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE.

In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html

Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee

The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government's decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010

2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf

And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.

full text 18 pages ;

http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf

please see full text ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html

[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:

"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.

http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241545887.pdf

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:

"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.

The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"

http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=20100405.1091

When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

Monday, September 26, 2011

L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html

Sunday, November 13, 2011

California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/california-bse-mad-cow-beef-recall-qfc.html

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST

WHERE did we go wrong $$$

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html

SEE FULL TEXT OF ALL THIS HERE ;

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

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Alabama BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report

May 2, 2006

snip...

Because the index cow had no evidence of having ever been tagged or branded, this farm can be excluded as a source of the index cow. This trace thread is closed.

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The new owner did not recall the exact cattle in question but was very certain that any cattle sold from Farm JJ (under either owner) would have had ear tags in place, and if sold before the 2001 dispersal, would have been branded on the right hip. Because the index cow had no evidence of having ever been tagged or branded, this farm can be excluded as a source of the index cow. This trace thread is closed.

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However, he could not find any records for that sale and all stockyard records were destroyed in a fire during 2000. The owner of Farm KK stated he had not sold any cattle privately to Farm Q and did not know who purchased the cattle at the stockyard.

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He thinks the cows had tags in their ears but is not sure.

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All stockyard records prior to 2000 were destroyed in a fire, so tracing this cow further back is not possible. This trace thread has been closed.

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Two red cows were consigned to the stockyard on October 13, 2001, from Farm W, one of which was purchased by Farm D. There are approximately 50 cows of various breeds currently located on Farm W. The owner of Farm W has maintained a cow herd since 1973 and does not maintain identification on his cattle. The owner of Farm W does not recall details about the animal being traced through his farm; however, farm records indicated that the animal would likely have been one of two red cows purchased from a stockyard on May 1, 2001. Although the owner of Farm W typically retains heifers, the calves from both of these cows were sold on October 10, 2001, according to the stockyard’s records. No animals remain on this farm for genetic testing. Records collected from the stockyard indicate that the purchase weight for these traced animals was 580 and 650 lbs, both of which fall below the minimum weight defined in the SOP for investigation. These cows are excluded as the index cow based on their weights at the time of sale. This trace thread is closed.

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He stated that all his cattle were tagged, either at the time of purchase, or by him after bringing them to his farm. Farm Y sold out all cattle during 2004 but has since begun accumulating cattle again. The index cow did not have horns and there was no evidence of dehorning or tagging. In addition, no eligible animals remain in the herd for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.

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Farm Z consigned three red cow and calf pairs to the stockyard on June 6, 2001. These animals were later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm Z has land (owned and rented) in many locations and occasionally runs cattle on some of this land. He reported that his practice was to buy entire herds and sell the complete herd a few months later. He sold all of his cattle accumulated from the mid-1990s during May or June of 2001 and was without cattle until later in the year when he began restocking. He has since bought and sold groups of cattle several times but keeps no records himself. There are no eligible animals remaining for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.

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A red cow and calf pair was consigned to the stockyard by a dairy, identified as Farm BB, on November 10, 2001. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm BB is comprised of a milking Holstein dairy with about 300 milking animals. The owners of Farm BB also have approximately 400 mixed breed beef cattle maintained as a cow/calf operation. Farm BB does not retain any heifers as replacements for either the dairy operation or the beef operation. They buy all their replacement cows for the dairy and buy beef cattle to raise a calf then resell the cow with a calf within a 12-to 18-month time period. When asked about records of purchased cattle, one of the owners stated that he could not locate any records prior to 2002.

snip...

Farm BB utilized the services of a cattle dealer to purchase cattle at various stockyards in the region. Some of the cattle might have had ear tags prior to purchase but the owners did not put in their own ear tags when the cattle were bought. The current herd at Farm BB is comprised of various breeds of beef cattle, but they would not be the same cattle that were present in 2001, since all cows at the premises are sold within a 12- to 18-month period (with calves) after purchase. Therefore, this trace thread is closed.

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Farm CC consigned a red cow to the stockyard on December 8, 2001. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm CC has no cattle at this time. The owner of Farm CC has no records of cattle that he has owned and no memory of the particular animal being traced. There are no animals on the farm eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.

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Farm DD consigned a red cow to the stockyard on December 12, 2001 that was later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm DD has no records of his cattle operation. He currently owns three cows, one bull, and two calves. All are black and none has identification. Additionally, the owner has stated that he has never owned any cows more than two years. No animals currently on the farm were present at the time the traced cow was sold and no offspring were retained from that time. There are no eligible animals remaining on this farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.

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Farm EE consigned a red cow to the stockyard on March 3, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. All cattle on Farm EE were sold two or three years ago. No records of sales or purchases were kept. No animals remain on this farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.

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The owner of Farm FF has no knowledge or records of the cow in question other than that the cow would have been purchased through the same stockyard where it was sold. Purchase records prior to 2000 for this stockyard were destroyed in a fire. There are no eligible animals on the farm for genetic testing and this trace thread is closed.

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Farm GG consigned a red cow to the stockyard on June 21, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm GG runs a feeding operation and normally purchases 350 to 450 lb steers and heifers for feeding out. He generally has fewer than 700 head at any one time. Farm GG reported selling the entire cow herd between late 2000 and early 2001. He has no recollection or records of the traced animal. Most of his cows at that time were purchased either through the stockyard or by private. He did not keep offspring of his cattle. No eligible animals remain on the farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.

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On review of his records, the owner believes that the cow sold at the stockyard on October 11, 2000, was one that was purchased through the same stockyard on April 3, 2000. That cow was tagged on his farm with a green bangle tag #6. There was no tag in the index cow’s ear, nor was there evidence of a either a hole or scar. This cow is excluded as the index cow based on the known presence of an ear tag. This trace thread is closed.

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Farm K sold an 18-month old red heifer through a stockyard that was later purchased by Farm E. The cow in question had been tested for brucellosis at the stockyard and an official brucellosis ear tag was placed in its ear. The cow was at the minimum age for tracing at the time of sale. Because all cattle on Farm K were dispersed in 2003 and no animals remain on the farm and because the index case had not been ear tagged. This traced is closed.

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Summary:

Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf

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Release No. 0336.05 Contact: USDA Jim Rogers 202-690-4755 FDA Rae Jones 301-827- 6242

Printable version Email this page

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Aug. 30, 2005

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have completed their investigations regarding a cow that tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in June 2005. The agencies conducted these investigations in collaboration with the Texas Animal Health Commission and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service.

Our results indicate that the positive animal, called the index animal, was born and raised on a ranch (termed the "index farm") in Texas. It was a cream colored Brahma cross approximately 12 years old at the time of its death. It was born prior to the implementation of the 1997 feed ban instituted by FDA to help minimize the risk that a cow might consume feed contaminated with the agent thought to cause BSE. The animal was sold through a livestock sale in November of 2004 and transported to a packing plant. The animal was dead upon arrival at the packing plant and was then shipped to a pet food plant where it was sampled for BSE. The plant did not use the animal in its product, and the carcass was destroyed in November 2004.

APHIS attempted to trace all adult animals that left the index farm after 1990, as well as all progeny born within 2 years of the index animal's death. Together, these animals are called animals of interest.

During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.

To determine whether contaminated feed could have played a role in the index animal's infection, FDA and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service conducted a feed investigation with two main objectives: 1) to identify all protein sources in the animal=s feed history that could potentially have been the source of the BSE agent, and 2) to verify that cattle leaving the herd after 1997 were identified by USDA as animals of interest and were rendered in compliance with the 1997 BSE/ruminant feed rule.

The feed history investigation identified 21 feeds or feed supplements that were used on the farm since 1990. These feed ingredients were purchased from three retail feed stores and were manufactured at nine feed mills. This investigation found that no feed or feed supplements used on the farm since 1997 were formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein. Due to this finding, FDA has concluded that the animal was most likely infected prior to the 1997 BSE/ruminant feed rule.

The investigation into the disposition of herd mates from this farm involved visits to nine slaughter plants and eight rendering plants. The investigation found that all of the rendering plants were operating in compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed rule. A review of the inspection history of each of these rendering firms found no violations of the FDA feed ban rule.

APHIS and FDA are very pleased with the results of their investigations, which show the animals of interest did not present a threat to livestock and that the ruminant feed rule is being followed. The U.S. maintains an interlocking system of safeguards designed to prevent BSE from entering the human and animal food chain. USDA also remains vigilant in its attempt to find BSE in the United States. To date, there have been more than 450,000 animals tested in the last 14 months and only two BSE positive animals found in this country.

For more information on USDA's epidemiological investigation and a copy of the report, please visit the APHIS website at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse.html

or

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf

For more information on FDA's feed investigation, please visit the FDA's website at

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm

Last Modified: 08/31/2005

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml

snip...see full text ;

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html

Thursday, July 28, 2011

An Update on the Animal Disease Traceability Framework July 27, 2011

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2011/07/update-on-animal-disease-traceability.html

Friday, August 20, 2010

USDA: Animal Disease Traceability August 2010 USDA: Animal Disease Traceability August 2010

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BSE, USDA, NAIS, AND TRACEABILITY

Let's look at how the USDA et al trace BSE aka mad cow cases, birth, and index herd cattle in the past (or rather how they could not trace them).

TEXAS MAD COW (h-BSE), that was finally tested and documented 7+ months after an act of Congress, and Scientist from all over the Globe questioning the testing methods and negative findings of this Texas mad cow. ...

TEXAS h-BSE MAD COW CASE THAT WAS FINALLY DOCUMENTED

Birth Cohort The owner of Farm A kept very few herd records; this made finding documentation on this cow’s birth cohort difficult. The birth cohort, by definition, included all cattle born on the positive animal’s birth premises within 1 year, before or after, the positive animal’s date of birth. The index cow was approximately 12 years of age in November 2004, but there was no exact birth date in the herd records. A potential age range of 11 to 13 years was used to sufficiently cover the animal’s most likely age. Using this range, all cattle born on the index premises between 1990 and 1995 were considered part of the birth cohort. In lieu of the owner’s records, herd records from Veterinary Services’ Generic Database (GDB) were used to compile a list of brucellosis calfhood vaccination (CV) tag numbers from the index herd that corresponded to animals to be included in the birth cohort. There were 121 animals identified through GDB as having been calfhood vaccinated on the index farm between 1991 and 1994. The owner of Farm A did not calfhood vaccinate after 1994. Moreover, calfhood vaccinates include only heifers. Therefore, the list of 121 animals was not a complete list of all birth cohorts. However the tracing that response personnel conducted on other COI was designed to account for the remainder of the birth cohorts.

Feed Cohort ...

SNIP...

Tracing of Progeny

The 2003/2004 progeny of the index cow was known to have left the farm through a specific livestock market sometime between February and October 2004. The 2002/2003 progeny of the index cow left the farm through the same market sometime between January

8

and December 2003. Response personnel learned early in the investigation that animals from the index farm were sold not only under the index farm owner’s name and that of his wife, but also by other members of the owner’s immediate family. Additionally, there were no herd records to indicate the gender of the two at-risk progeny. Therefore, market records for February through October 2004 and January through December 2003 were obtained for all calves sold both by Farm A’s owner and by members of his immediate family; response personnel traced all such calves to determine their disposition. With the index herd being composed of mixed breed beef cattle, the calves that left the farm were genetically unsuitable for use as replacement animals or for sale as breeding stock, a fact that was confirmed by the trace work and the documentation of the final disposition of the calves of interest.

Response personnel ultimately identified 213 calves of interest to be traced. Of these, 208 were confirmed to have entered known rendering/slaughter channels, 4 were presumed to have entered rendering/slaughter channels, and 1 was purchased in cash through a livestock market with no buyer name or contact information (this animal was classified as untraceable. See Appendix 1). A calf was categorized as presumed to have entered rendering/slaughter channels if it passed through at least one livestock market subsequent to its original sale and could not be individually traced due to unknown resale date and new backtag, but all calves resold matching that description during an appropriate date range were purchased by known rendering/slaughter order buyers.

It was not possible to DNA test the calves that entered known rendering and slaughter channels – most were of an age in which they were likely to have been slaughtered prior to the time of the investigation. There were no calves traced to farms outside of rendering and slaughter channels.

Tracing of Birth Cohorts

Since there were essentially no records maintained on the index farm, it was necessary to compile the list of known birth cohorts using brucellosis CV tag numbers for this herd from the period 1991 to 1994. The calves vaccinated during that time period were part of the index cow’s birth cohort and tracing activities centered on finding those animals. There were 121 animals whose CV tag number and/or tattoo included them as part of the birth cohort. Of those 121 animals, 67 animals were definitively accounted for (42 were found in the index herd, removed, and tested BSE negative; 25 were identified as having left Farm A through the market system and were traced, 11 of those were reported slaughtered, 13 were classified as presumed dead, and 1 was found alive, euthanized, and tested BSE negative). Of the remaining 54 animals from the birth cohort, there may have been several that died within the index herd, but the majority likely left the herd without identification and would have been either re-tagged at the livestock market or consigned directly to slaughter without identification. To account for these remaining birth cohorts, all adult cattle that left the index farm since 1990 were traced as COI.

9

Tracing of Cattle of Interest

The investigation revealed that many animals left Farm A, arrived at markets without any identification tags, and were subsequently re-tagged at the market. Due to lack of farm records, it is unknown which of these re-tagged animals may have belonged to the birth cohort. As a result, all animals that may have left Farm A since 1990 were traced as COI. Additionally, animals from the index farm were sold not only under the index farm owner’s name and that of his wife, but also by other members of the owner’s immediate family; therefore, cattle sold from the index farm by all pertinent family members were traced. There were some older animals that left the index farm but were able to be excluded from further trace work because they were known not to have been part of the birth cohort or feed cohort of the index cow despite their being of the appropriate age. The index farm owner’s late father had maintained a herd of cattle separate from the index farm but which was added to the index farm in 1997. Complete herd test data and CV data from the GDB was obtained for the father’s herd and those animals were excluded from the tracing activities.

There were a total of 200 COI traced: 143 were reported to have been slaughtered (131 of those were confirmed as having been slaughtered), 1 is known to have died previously and was buried, 2 were found alive (1 was a known birth cohort that tested negative, 1 was determined not to be one of the cattle of interest due to her young age), 34 were classified as presumed dead, 20 were classified as untraceable. (See Appendix 1). Animals were confirmed at slaughter using GDB slaughter testing data or the hard copies of slaughter testing Form 4-54.

An animal was classified as presumed dead if records that could be used to advance the tracing of the animal were exhausted or did not exist, and the age of the animal at the time of the investigation was estimated to be at least 11 years old or older. Since the index herd was not a purebred or seedstock operation, and animals leaving the herd were unlikely to be purchased as replacement cattle, standard industry practices indicated that most adult animals that had left the herd would have been culled and slaughtered by the time they were in this age group. Additionally, this age cutoff was arrived at through review of market records and the specific years in which Farm A sold cattle through the market. An animal was classified as untraceable if all records to advance the tracing of the animal were exhausted or did not exist, and the age of the animal at the time of the investigation was estimated to be less than 11 years of age (the animal, therefore, could not be presumed dead).

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Trace Herd 1

The owner of Trace Herd 1 was identified as having received one of the adult COI from the index herd. Trace Herd 1 contained 909 head of cattle in multiple pastures and was placed under hold order on 7/21/05. Upon completion of herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 1 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 1 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 2

Trace Herd 2 was identified as having received one of the adult COI from the index herd. Trace Herd 2 contained 19 head of cattle on one pasture and was placed under hold order on 7/25/05. The owner of Trace Herd 2 identified the animal of interest by her eartag while he was feeding his cattle out of a bucket and individually penned her for inspection by field personnel. While the cow was identified as one of the animals that had left the index farm, her age by dentition was estimated to be only 5 years old, which was too young to have placed her as part of the birth or feed cohort of the index animal. She was classified as found alive but determined not to be one of the COI; the hold order on Trace Herd 2 was released on 7/26/05.

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Trace Herd 3

The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.

Trace Herd 4

The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.

Trace Herd 5

The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 6

The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.

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Trace Herd 7

The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 8

Trace Herd 8 received an animal of interest, which happened to be a known birth cohort of the index cow, from Trace Herd 5. Trace Herd 8 consists of 146 head of cattle that were placed under hold order on 8/4/05. A herd inventory was conducted, the birth cohort was found alive in the herd, and she was purchased and euthanized. The hold order on Trace Herd 8 was released on 8/4/05. The cow was sampled on 8/5/05 and BSE tested by ELISA at NVSL. Results were negative (as reported on 8/6/05); carcass disposal was completed by alkaline digestion.

Analysis of Data on Presumed Dead and Untraceable Animals

CEAH performed an analysis of the minimum estimated ages of those COI that were classified as either presumed dead or untraceable to determine the likely disposition of those animals based on their ages. Moreover, CEAH performed an analysis of the likely disposition of the one calf that was classified as untraceable during the investigation.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html

OF course, the birth and herd cohorts of this highly suspect, stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas, will never be known ;

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms

On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/new01061.html

snip...see full text ;

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/08/usda-animal-disease-traceability-august.html

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html

Friday, March 13, 2009

NAIS comments NCBA and R-Calf Wednesday, March 11, 2009 - 10:30 a.m. Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry - Public Hearing

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE Greetings,

I do not understand the logic behind the fear to NAIS and COOL ?

I really don't.

Everything about us is traceable by the Government. Birth certificate, driver's license, social security number, your deed to your house, property, house number, car title, all the parts of your car are traceable, even each owner of the car since it rolled off the assembly line, boat, motor, etc. etc.

SO why all the concern on traceability of the food we eat ?

WHY does most folks in the industry fear this so much $$$

The fear of the NAIS and or COOL seems to be that no one wants their product to be traceable, because of fear of litigation from contaminated food, rather than the excuse of not wanting the Government messing in your business. Just my opinion.

An example would be the California mad cow beef recall (see history below), that eventually humans were exposed to suspect mad cow beef. A lot of folks. Same as with the Dead Stock Downer Cow School Lunch Program. These kids all across our Nation, for four years and probably longer, were fed the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease from dead stock downer cows, where the largest beef recall (at the time) took place, of which, a great deal were already consumed by our children. With an incubation period of 50+ years in some cases, in others much shorter, who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ?

snip...see full text ;

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2009/12/nais-cool-from-farm-to-fork-mad-cow.html

Tuesday, November 08, 2011

Can Mortality Data Provide Reliable Indicators for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance? A Study in France from 2000 to 2008 Vol. 37, No. 3-4, 2011

Original Paper

Conclusions:

These findings raise doubt about the possibility of a reliable CJD surveillance only based on mortality data.

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/11/can-mortality-data-provide-reliable.html

U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ? (see video at bottom)

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html

2006

USA sporadic CJD cases rising ;

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf

2008

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html

CJD USA RISING, with UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE ;

5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases;

*** 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

Thursday, August 4, 2011

Terry Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis, Date aired: 27 Jun 2011

(SEE VIDEO)

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/terry-singeltary-sr-on-creutzfeldt.html

Sunday, August 21, 2011

The British disease, or a disease gone global, The TSE Prion Disease

(SEE VIDEO)

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/british-disease-or-disease-gone-global.html

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

Friday, November 04, 2011

Diagnostic accuracy of cerebrospinal fluid protein markers for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in Canada: a 6-year prospective study Research article

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/11/diagnostic-accuracy-of-cerebrospinal.html

WHO WILL FOLLOW THE CHILDREN FOR CJD SYMPTOMS ???

Saturday, May 2, 2009

U.S. GOVERNMENT SUES WESTLAND/HALLMARK MEAT OVER USDA CERTIFIED DEADSTOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/us-government-sues-westlandhallmark.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

De novo induction of amyloid-ß deposition in vivo

Molecular Psychiatry advance online publication 4 October 2011; doi: 10.1038/mp.2011.120

Molecular Psychiatry advance online publication 4 October 2011; doi: 10.1038/mp.2011.120

De novo induction of amyloid-ß deposition in vivo

R Morales1,2, C Duran-Aniotz1,3, J Castilla2,4, L D Estrada2,5 and C Soto1,2

1Mitchell Center for Alzheimer's Disease and Related Brain Disorders, Department of Neurology, University of Texas Houston Medical School, Houston, TX, USA 2University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, Galveston, TX, USA 3Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de Medicina. Av. San Carlos de Apoquindo 2200, Las Condes, Santiago, Chile 4CIC bioGUNE, Parque Tecnologico de Biskaia, Ed 800, 48160 Derio and IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, 48011 Bilbao, Spain

Correspondence: Dr C Soto, Mitchell Center for Alzheimer's Disease and Related Brain Disorders, Department of Neurology, University of Texas Houston Medical School, 6431 Fannin St, Houston, TX 77030, USA. E-mail: Claudio.Soto@uth.tmc.edu

5Current address: Laboratorio de Señalización Celular, Centro de Envejecimiento y Regeneración. P. Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Received 8 March 2011; Revised 15 August 2011; Accepted 25 August 2011; Published online 4 October 2011.

Abstract

Alzheimer's disease (AD), the most common type of senile dementia, is associated to the build-up of misfolded amyloid-ß (Aß) in the brain. Although compelling evidences indicate that the misfolding and oligomerization of Aß is the triggering event in AD, the mechanisms responsible for the initiation of Aß accumulation are unknown. In this study, we show that Aß deposition can be induced by injection of AD brain extracts into animals, which, without exposure to this material, will never develop these alterations. The accumulation of Aß deposits increased progressively with the time after inoculation, and the Aß lesions were observed in brain areas far from the injection site. Our results suggest that some of the typical brain abnormalities associated with AD can be induced by a prion-like mechanism of disease transmission through propagation of protein misfolding. These findings may have broad implications for understanding the molecular mechanisms responsible for the initiation of AD, and may contribute to the development of new strategies for disease prevention and intervention.

Keywords:

amyloid; prion; protein misfolding; disease transmission

http://www.nature.com/mp/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/mp2011120a.html

see more here ;

http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2011/10/de-novo-induction-of-amyloid-deposition.html

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/alzheimers-disease-is-transmissible.html

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

PrioNet Canada researchers in Vancouver confirm prion-like properties in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS)

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/09/prionet-canada-researchers-in-vancouver.html

POLITICAL BSe and CJD and THE WOW FACTOR $$$

Monday, September 26, 2011

Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy, Prionpathy, Prionopathy, FFI, GSS, gCJD, hvCJD, sCJD, TSE, PRION, update 2011

http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/09/variably-protease-sensitive-prionopathy.html

Mad Cow Scaremongers

Mad Cow Scaremongers by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. a review of the TSE prion agent 2003-2011

re-2003

"he also blindly insists upon a mad-cow with Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and Lou Gehrig’s disease."

http://www.seac.gov.uk/pdf/hol-response091008.pdf

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/seac-science-and-technology-committees.html

SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/09/mad-cow-scaremongers.html

layperson

TSS

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

An Update on the Animal Disease Traceability Framework July 27, 2011

2011-07-28T10:35:00.000-07:00

An Update on the Animal Disease Traceability Framework

Posted by Dr. John R. Clifford, Deputy Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer for APHIS’ Veterinary Services’ program, on July 27, 2011 at 2:00 PM

On February 5, 2010, USDA announced a new, flexible framework for animal disease traceability in the United States. The Secretary of Agriculture and other USDA officials launched a widespread listening tour in 2010 to hear comments, concerns, and to discuss potential solutions to create a program producers can feel comfortable supporting.

USDA believes the traceability framework provides the basic tenets of an improved animal disease traceability capability. USDA continues to review and use comments and discussions collected during the listening tour to develop a flexible, coordinated approach for livestock moving interstate. The purpose of the draft proposed regulation for livestock moving interstate has always been to:

Apply only to animals moved interstate; Be administered by the States and Tribal Nations to provide more flexibility; Encourage the use of lower-cost technology; and Be implemented transparently through federal regulations and the full rulemaking process. It is also important to note how the proposed framework will affect the practice of branding for livestock moving interstate.

USDA supports the use of brands to identify cattle moving interstate. Further, USDA recognizes the value of brands and their prevalence in the western United States. The approach in the draft proposed regulation will provide flexibility for States and Tribes to use brands for compliance with the proposed requirements for interstate movement.

Under USDA’s traceability framework and the upcoming draft proposed regulation for livestock moving interstate, those States and Tribes who elect to use brands will be allowed to do so. The draft proposed regulation clearly states that cattle and bison moved between shipping and receiving States or Tribes may alternatively be identified with another form of identification, including brands, tattoos, and breed registry certificates as agreed upon by animal health officials in the shipping and receiving States or Tribes.

In the draft proposed rule, USDA will define official identification methods for each species. Establishing the official identification method in the draft proposed rule will provide clarity to livestock owners and ensure that no one State or Tribe can deny a method of official identification or require a specific method of official identification for entry of livestock into their jurisdiction. These official identification methods or devices will be accepted by all States and Tribes for the entry of livestock into their jurisdictions, in addition to those agreed upon by animal health officials in the shipping and receiving State or Tribes.

Tags: Animal Traceability, APHIS, Tom Vilsack, USDA

http://blogs.usda.gov/2011/07/27/an-update-on-the-animal-disease-traceability-framework/

Friday, August 20, 2010

USDA: Animal Disease Traceability August 2010 USDA: Animal Disease Traceability August 2010

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/08/usda-animal-disease-traceability-august.html

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html

Friday, March 13, 2009

NAIS comments NCBA and R-Calf Wednesday, March 11, 2009 - 10:30 a.m. Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry - Public Hearing

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html

QFC s Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit

Family claims QFC should have used customer database to warn those at risk sooner

March 05, 2004

snip...

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

JILL CROWSON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

VS

QUALITY FOOD CENTERS, INC., an Ohio corporation Defendent

NO. 04-2-05608-0 SEA

snip...

The Court hereby GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims based on a manufacturer's strict liability (Counts I and II) and DENIES the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of negligence by a product seller (Count III).

DATED this 14th day of June, 2004

snip...

http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/Mad%20Cow%20Order%20Denying%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss1088546283878.pdf

http://www.hbsslaw.com/flash/files/Mad%20Cow%20Order%20Denying%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss1088546283878.pdf

* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0551.pdf

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d0551.html

http://agri.nv.gov/GAO_FDA%20Mgmt%20Mad%20Cow%20IMprove_Feb05.pdf

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf

October 2004

FOOD SAFETY USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food

snip...

see full text ;

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

IN CONFIDENCE

The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

Thursday, November 18, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html

Saturday, August 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html

Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html

MAD COW TSE PRION UPDATE NORTH AMERICA 2011

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html

Sunday, June 26, 2011

Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-analysis-of-low-dose-prion.html

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/experimental-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html

Thursday, July 21, 2011

A Second Case of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease Linked to the G131V Mutation in the Prion Protein Gene in a Dutch Patient Journal of Neuropathology & Experimental Neurology:

August 2011 - Volume 70 - Issue 8 - pp 698-702

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/second-case-of-gerstmann-straussler.html

Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Galveston, Texas - Isle port moves through thousands of heifers headed to Russia, none from Texas, Alabama, or Washington, due to BSE risk factor

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/galveston-texas-isle-port-moves-through.html

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html

Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129

Saturday, July 23, 2011

CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/cattle-heads-with-tonsils-beef-tongues.html

Thursday, June 2, 2011

USDA scrapie report for April 2011 NEW ATYPICAL NOR-98 SCRAPIE CASES Pennsylvania AND California

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/usda-scrapie-report-for-april-2011-new.html

Monday, June 20, 2011 2011

Annual Conference of the National Institute for Animal Agriculture ATYPICAL NOR-98 LIKE SCRAPIE UPDATE USA

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/2011-annual-conference-of-national.html

Monday, June 27, 2011

Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease

http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/comparison-of-sheep-nor98-with-human.html

Monday, November 30, 2009

USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html

I strenuously urge the USDA and the OIE et al to revoke the exemption of the legal global trading of atypical Nor-98 scrapie TSE. ...TSS

Friday, February 11, 2011

Atypical/Nor98 Scrapie Infectivity in Sheep Peripheral Tissues

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/02/atypicalnor98-scrapie-infectivity-in.html

Monday, June 27, 2011

Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease

http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/comparison-of-sheep-nor98-with-human.html

Thursday, July 14, 2011

Histopathological Studies of “CH1641-Like” Scrapie Sources Versus Classical Scrapie and BSE Transmitted to Ovine Transgenic Mice (TgOvPrP4)

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/histopathological-studies-of-ch1641.html

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Increased susceptibility of human-PrP transgenic mice to bovine spongiform encephalopathy following passage in sheep

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/increased-susceptibility-of-human-prp.html

Sunday, October 3, 2010

Scrapie, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, and BSE in sheep and goats North America, who's looking ?

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/10/scrapie-nor-98-atypical-scrapie-and-bse.html

Wednesday, July 06, 2011

Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation

(see tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce USA...tss)

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/swine-are-susceptible-to-chronic.html

Monday, June 27, 2011

Zoonotic Potential of CWD: Experimental Transmissions to Non-Human Primates

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/06/zoonotic-potential-of-cwd-experimental.html

Please see the following warning from CDC about prion TSE consumption in North America ;

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey

Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 111, Issue 6 , Pages 858-863, June 2011.

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/travel-history-hunting-and-venison.html

UPDATE JULY 2011 MORE OF THE "PENDING CLASSIFICATION CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE'' STEADY INCREASING...TSS

case; 5 Includes 13 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 18 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 18 (15 from 2011) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

Monday, August 9, 2010

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)

(please watch and listen to the video and the scientist speaking about atypical BSE and sporadic CJD and listen to Professor Aguzzi)

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE.

When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/

Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee

The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government's decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010

2.65 At its hearing on 14 May 2010, the committee heard evidence from Dr Alan Fahey who has recently submitted a thesis on the clinical neuropsychiatric, epidemiological and diagnostic features of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.48 Dr Fahey told the committee of his concerns regarding the lengthy incubation period for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, the inadequacy of current tests and the limited nature of our current understanding of this group of diseases.49

2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo-has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf

Monday, May 23, 2011

Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011

Top Curr Chem (2011)

DOI: 10.1007/128_2011_161

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar

Abstract

Although prion diseases, such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans and scrapie in sheep, have long been recognized, our understanding of their epidemiology and pathogenesis is still in its early stages. Progress is hampered by the lengthy incubation periods and the lack of effective ways of monitoring and characterizing these agents. Protease-resistant conformers of the prion protein (PrP), known as the "scrapie form" (PrPSc), are used as disease markers, and for taxonomic purposes, in correlation with clinical, pathological, and genetic data. In humans, prion diseases can arise sporadically (sCJD) or genetically (gCJD and others), caused by mutations in the PrP-gene (PRNP), or as a foodborne infection, with the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) causing variant CJD (vCJD). Person-to-person spread of human prion disease has only been known to occur following cannibalism (kuru disease in Papua New Guinea) or through medical or surgical treatment (iatrogenic CJD, iCJD). In contrast, scrapie in small ruminants and chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids behave as infectious diseases within these species. Recently, however, so-called atypical forms of prion diseases have been discovered in sheep (atypical/Nor98 scrapie) and in cattle, BSE-H and BSE-L. These maladies resemble sporadic or genetic human prion diseases and might be their animal equivalents. This hypothesis also raises the significant public health question of possible epidemiological links between these diseases and their counterparts in humans.

M.A. Tranulis (*)

Norwegian School of Veterinary Science, Oslo, Norway

e-mail: Michael.Tranulis@nvh.no

S.L. Benestad

Norwegian Veterinary Institute, Oslo, Norway

T. Baron

Agence Nationale de Se´curite´ Sanitaire, ANSES, Lyon, France

H. Kretzschmar

Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, Munich, Germany

Keywords Animal Atypical Atypical/Nor98 scrapie BSE-H BSE-L Human Prion disease Prion strain Prion type

http://resources.metapress.com/pdf-preview.axd?code=f433r34h34ugg617&size=largest

snip...SEE MORE HERE ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

EFSA and ECDC review scientific evidence on possible links between TSEs in animals and humans Webnachricht 19 Januar 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/efsa-and-ecdc-review-scientific.html

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Agent strain variation in human prion disease: insights from a molecular and pathological review of the National Institutes of Health series of experimentally transmitted disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/agent-strain-variation-in-human-prion.html

Monday, May 11, 2009

Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

Canadian Researchers Receive $2.9 Million to Protect Against Prion Disease Outbreaks, Develop Novel Therapies to Treat Alzheimer's, Parkinson's and ALS

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/canadian-researchers-receive-29-million.html

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral...

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/06/tseac-meeting-august-1-2011-donor.html

http://sporadicffi.blogspot.com/

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/

TSS

USDA: Animal Disease Traceability August 2010

2010-08-20T18:25:00.000-07:00

USDA: Animal Disease Traceability August 2010

Greetings,

as a consumer, my opinion (if that matters), you need some sort of traceability for your livestock. I don't want to know anything about your family, your income, your kids, your sex life, nothing but to be able to trace that animal from farm to fork. I want to know whether or not if that animal has been fed animal protein, antibiotics, and if myself or my family do get sick, we should be able to trace that product. I don't see the problem. you can trace every part on your car, I can find out anything I want about you on the internet. why can't I do that with a cow?

let's review a few things about the NAIS, why we need it past and present. let's review first the few mad cows that were accidently found, birth cohorts, herd cohorts etc., and how efficient or NOT the traceability of those 4 animals were....oops, that's right, the first stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas was sent straight to the render, did not pass GO(inspection), did not get $200.(prion rapid test), and of course, was never confirmed. THEN the second mad cow, the one that would never have been confirmed if not for an act of Congress and the Honorable Fong of the OIG, and scientist from the EU and the USA asking questions, meanwhile the BSE MRR was being finalized. Then after 7 months of sitting on the shelf, after a secret test had already turned up positive, but yet still 7 months no confirmation on a BSE positive test that by the BSE Red Books, it should have been a 48 hour turnaround on that test. Finally, the 2nd Texas mad cow was confirmed positive BSE. later termed atypical h-BSE. Then you had the Alabama mad cow, now termed g-h-BSEalabama, and then of course the mad cow old Luther capped in Washington state, the white one, that changed colors, and then was said to be a Canadian traitor c-BSE mad cow. IT's all Canada's fault ;-(NOT)

Be sure to see the latest data on the typical and atypical cases of BSE and Scrapie and any human CJD TSE there from. This is down toward the bottom of the posting.

BSE, USDA, NAIS, AND TRACEABILITY

Let's look at how the USDA et al trace BSE aka mad cow cases, birth, and index herd cattle in the past (or rather how they could not trace them).

TEXAS MAD COW (h-BSE), that was finally tested and documented 7+ months after an act of Congress, and Scientist from all over the Globe questioning the testing methods and negative findings of this Texas mad cow. ...

TEXAS h-BSE MAD COW CASE THAT WAS FINALLY DOCUMENTED

Birth Cohort The owner of Farm A kept very few herd records; this made finding documentation on this cow’s birth cohort difficult. The birth cohort, by definition, included all cattle born on the positive animal’s birth premises within 1 year, before or after, the positive animal’s date of birth. The index cow was approximately 12 years of age in November 2004, but there was no exact birth date in the herd records. A potential age range of 11 to 13 years was used to sufficiently cover the animal’s most likely age. Using this range, all cattle born on the index premises between 1990 and 1995 were considered part of the birth cohort. In lieu of the owner’s records, herd records from Veterinary Services’ Generic Database (GDB) were used to compile a list of brucellosis calfhood vaccination (CV) tag numbers from the index herd that corresponded to animals to be included in the birth cohort. There were 121 animals identified through GDB as having been calfhood vaccinated on the index farm between 1991 and 1994. The owner of Farm A did not calfhood vaccinate after 1994. Moreover, calfhood vaccinates include only heifers. Therefore, the list of 121 animals was not a complete list of all birth cohorts. However the tracing that response personnel conducted on other COI was designed to account for the remainder of the birth cohorts.

Feed Cohort ...

SNIP...

Tracing of Progeny

The 2003/2004 progeny of the index cow was known to have left the farm through a specific livestock market sometime between February and October 2004. The 2002/2003 progeny of the index cow left the farm through the same market sometime between January

8

and December 2003. Response personnel learned early in the investigation that animals from the index farm were sold not only under the index farm owner’s name and that of his wife, but also by other members of the owner’s immediate family. Additionally, there were no herd records to indicate the gender of the two at-risk progeny. Therefore, market records for February through October 2004 and January through December 2003 were obtained for all calves sold both by Farm A’s owner and by members of his immediate family; response personnel traced all such calves to determine their disposition. With the index herd being composed of mixed breed beef cattle, the calves that left the farm were genetically unsuitable for use as replacement animals or for sale as breeding stock, a fact that was confirmed by the trace work and the documentation of the final disposition of the calves of interest.

Response personnel ultimately identified 213 calves of interest to be traced. Of these, 208 were confirmed to have entered known rendering/slaughter channels, 4 were presumed to have entered rendering/slaughter channels, and 1 was purchased in cash through a livestock market with no buyer name or contact information (this animal was classified as untraceable. See Appendix 1). A calf was categorized as presumed to have entered rendering/slaughter channels if it passed through at least one livestock market subsequent to its original sale and could not be individually traced due to unknown resale date and new backtag, but all calves resold matching that description during an appropriate date range were purchased by known rendering/slaughter order buyers.

It was not possible to DNA test the calves that entered known rendering and slaughter channels – most were of an age in which they were likely to have been slaughtered prior to the time of the investigation. There were no calves traced to farms outside of rendering and slaughter channels.

Tracing of Birth Cohorts

Since there were essentially no records maintained on the index farm, it was necessary to compile the list of known birth cohorts using brucellosis CV tag numbers for this herd from the period 1991 to 1994. The calves vaccinated during that time period were part of the index cow’s birth cohort and tracing activities centered on finding those animals. There were 121 animals whose CV tag number and/or tattoo included them as part of the birth cohort. Of those 121 animals, 67 animals were definitively accounted for (42 were found in the index herd, removed, and tested BSE negative; 25 were identified as having left Farm A through the market system and were traced, 11 of those were reported slaughtered, 13 were classified as presumed dead, and 1 was found alive, euthanized, and tested BSE negative). Of the remaining 54 animals from the birth cohort, there may have been several that died within the index herd, but the majority likely left the herd without identification and would have been either re-tagged at the livestock market or consigned directly to slaughter without identification. To account for these remaining birth cohorts, all adult cattle that left the index farm since 1990 were traced as COI.

9

Tracing of Cattle of Interest

The investigation revealed that many animals left Farm A, arrived at markets without any identification tags, and were subsequently re-tagged at the market. Due to lack of farm records, it is unknown which of these re-tagged animals may have belonged to the birth cohort. As a result, all animals that may have left Farm A since 1990 were traced as COI. Additionally, animals from the index farm were sold not only under the index farm owner’s name and that of his wife, but also by other members of the owner’s immediate family; therefore, cattle sold from the index farm by all pertinent family members were traced. There were some older animals that left the index farm but were able to be excluded from further trace work because they were known not to have been part of the birth cohort or feed cohort of the index cow despite their being of the appropriate age. The index farm owner’s late father had maintained a herd of cattle separate from the index farm but which was added to the index farm in 1997. Complete herd test data and CV data from the GDB was obtained for the father’s herd and those animals were excluded from the tracing activities.

There were a total of 200 COI traced: 143 were reported to have been slaughtered (131 of those were confirmed as having been slaughtered), 1 is known to have died previously and was buried, 2 were found alive (1 was a known birth cohort that tested negative, 1 was determined not to be one of the cattle of interest due to her young age), 34 were classified as presumed dead, 20 were classified as untraceable. (See Appendix 1). Animals were confirmed at slaughter using GDB slaughter testing data or the hard copies of slaughter testing Form 4-54.

An animal was classified as presumed dead if records that could be used to advance the tracing of the animal were exhausted or did not exist, and the age of the animal at the time of the investigation was estimated to be at least 11 years old or older. Since the index herd was not a purebred or seedstock operation, and animals leaving the herd were unlikely to be purchased as replacement cattle, standard industry practices indicated that most adult animals that had left the herd would have been culled and slaughtered by the time they were in this age group. Additionally, this age cutoff was arrived at through review of market records and the specific years in which Farm A sold cattle through the market. An animal was classified as untraceable if all records to advance the tracing of the animal were exhausted or did not exist, and the age of the animal at the time of the investigation was estimated to be less than 11 years of age (the animal, therefore, could not be presumed dead).

snip...

Trace Herd 1

The owner of Trace Herd 1 was identified as having received one of the adult COI from the index herd. Trace Herd 1 contained 909 head of cattle in multiple pastures and was placed under hold order on 7/21/05. Upon completion of herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 1 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 1 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 2

Trace Herd 2 was identified as having received one of the adult COI from the index herd. Trace Herd 2 contained 19 head of cattle on one pasture and was placed under hold order on 7/25/05. The owner of Trace Herd 2 identified the animal of interest by her eartag while he was feeding his cattle out of a bucket and individually penned her for inspection by field personnel. While the cow was identified as one of the animals that had left the index farm, her age by dentition was estimated to be only 5 years old, which was too young to have placed her as part of the birth or feed cohort of the index animal. She was classified as found alive but determined not to be one of the COI; the hold order on Trace Herd 2 was released on 7/26/05.

11

Trace Herd 3

The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.

Trace Herd 4

The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.

Trace Herd 5

The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 6

The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.

12

Trace Herd 7

The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 8

Trace Herd 8 received an animal of interest, which happened to be a known birth cohort of the index cow, from Trace Herd 5. Trace Herd 8 consists of 146 head of cattle that were placed under hold order on 8/4/05. A herd inventory was conducted, the birth cohort was found alive in the herd, and she was purchased and euthanized. The hold order on Trace Herd 8 was released on 8/4/05. The cow was sampled on 8/5/05 and BSE tested by ELISA at NVSL. Results were negative (as reported on 8/6/05); carcass disposal was completed by alkaline digestion.

Analysis of Data on Presumed Dead and Untraceable Animals

CEAH performed an analysis of the minimum estimated ages of those COI that were classified as either presumed dead or untraceable to determine the likely disposition of those animals based on their ages. Moreover, CEAH performed an analysis of the likely disposition of the one calf that was classified as untraceable during the investigation.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html

OF course, the birth and herd cohorts of this highly suspect, stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas, will never be known ;

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms

On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/new01061.html

BSE UPDATE ALABAMA March 17, 2006

BSE Update From Alabama

News Date March 27, 2006

Alabama Agriculture Commissioner Ron Sparks and Alabama State Veterinarian Dr. Tony Frazier with the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries (ADAI) and USDA have provided an update on their ongoing joint investigation of the cow that died from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Alabama.

Since the investigation began, the ADAI and the USDA have followed multiple leads in the traceback process. At this time, 13 locations and 32 movements of cattle have been examined with 27 of those being substantially completed. Additional investigations of locations and herds will continue. In addition, state and federal officials have confirmed that a black bull calf was born in 2005 to the index animal (the red cow). The calf was taken by the owner to a local stockyard in July 2005 where the calf died. The calf was disposed of in a local landfill and did not enter the human or animal food chain.

Without a premises or animal ID program in place, the traceback process to find the herd of origin of the index cow is time-consuming and difficult. It includes conducting interviews, reviewing of records and documents, and testing of cattle DNA. State and federal officials have discovered several herds of interest and they are planning to use DNA testing to determine DNA linkage between the index cow and the herds. Through the DNA testing of these herds, investigators will attempt to find a genetic path that could lead to the herd of origin. Sparks stressed that the DNA testing being conducted on the herds is for genetic markers and is not a test for the disease BSE.

As part of the thorough investigative process, a large number of cattle may be tested in this phase and the number of herds included will continue to grow as the traceback progresses. Leads will be followed by state and federal officials until they are exhausted. Even when an index animal is traced to its birth herd, often cohorts of that animal are no longer in that herd. In addition, even if an animal's cohort has been exposed to the same infective material in feed, the other animals will not necessarily contract BSE.

BSE is not a contagious disease that spreads animal to animal, or animal to human. BSE spreads in cattle through the consumption of feed containing specified risk material (brain and spinal cord) derived from BSE infected cattle. The United States banned the use of such protein supplements in cattle feed since 1997. Sparks says that beef consumption in this country is safe and there are measures in place to see that it continues to be safe. For example, downer animals are not allowed to enter commerce for human consumption and there is a ban on feeding ruminant derived protein to cattle. (Contact: Bob Ehart)

News Contact: Bob Ehart; 202-296-9680

http://www.nasda.org/cms/7196/7347/10354.aspx

WELL, we know that the FDA mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997 was nothing but ink on paper. there is still animal protein in commerce in the USA being fed out to cattle and other livestock as we speak. see a few warning letters and or recalls here ;

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-99-25-detention-without.html

WE also know that the USDA certified dead stock downer cow school lunch program NSLP, fed these most high risk cattle for BSE and mad cow disease and other deadly pathogens to our children all across our Nation for over 4 YEARS, you can see this here ;

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/09/suit-meatpacker-used-downer-cows-for-4.html

AND there is evidence of cohort BSE documented (see at bottom) ;

Alabama BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report May 2, 2006

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf

ALSO, that Washington Mad Cow case ;

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and tertiary customers of the recalling company.

Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again to verify product disposition.

On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDA s Recall Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall, and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA considered the recall to be complete.

Recall Was Complicated by Inaccurate Distribution Lists and Mixing of Potentially Contaminated and Noncontaminated Beef USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the recalling company s three primary customers was slow in providing its customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that primary customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which specific customers received the product.

Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments, such as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they supply. ...

snip...

QFC sued over mad cow case

Grocer negligently exposed them to beef, family claims

Friday, March 5, 2004

snip...

QFC s Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit

Family claims QFC should have used customer database to warn those at risk sooner

March 05, 2004

snip...

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

JILL CROWSON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

VS

QUALITY FOOD CENTERS, INC., an Ohio corporation Defendent

NO. 04-2-05608-0 SEA

snip...

The Court hereby GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims based on a manufacturer's strict liability (Counts I and II) and DENIES the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of negligence by a product seller (Count III).

DATED this 14th day of June, 2004

snip...

http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/Mad%20Cow%20Order%20Denying%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss1088546283878.pdf

http://www.hbsslaw.com/flash/files/Mad%20Cow%20Order%20Denying%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss1088546283878.pdf

* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0551.pdf

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d0551.html

http://agri.nv.gov/GAO_FDA%20Mgmt%20Mad%20Cow%20IMprove_Feb05.pdf

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf

October 2004

FOOD SAFETY USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food

snip...

Do Stores That Offer Loyalty Cards Have a Duty to Notify Customers of Product Safety Recalls? A Recent Suit Raises This Novel Question By ANITA RAMASASTRY Thursday, Aug. 05, 2004 An interesting new Washington state court suit raises an important question: If a retailer benefits from collecting personally identifiable information about its customers, does it have a corresponding duty to use such data to alert its customers that products they've bought have been recalled for health or safety reasons? And if so, could turning over private data to companies actually create benefits, as well as privacy risks, for the consumer?

In the suit, consumer Jill Crowson is suing her grocery store -- Quality Food Center (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger -- for negligent infliction of emotional distress and disregard of a "duty to warn" under the Washington Product Liability Act. Crowson alleges in her complaint that QFC failed to alert her family that ground beef it had sold them had been recalled in December's mad-cow scare.

Yet, Crowson says, QFC easily could have done so through information it maintained connected with her Advantage card - a "loyalty card" that meant QFC had Crowson's name, address and purchasing information. According to her complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by consumers presenting the Advantage Card, including product description, date of purchase, store of purchase and the price, and saves that data alongside customer contact information.

Now, Crowson says, her family members "feel like walking time bombs" knowing they may be infected with the human form of mad-cow disease which the complaint states may have an up-to-30-year incubation period. And they are not the only ones: Crowson is seeking class action status for herself and what she believes are "hundreds" of similarly-situated Washington customers at QFC's approximately 40 stores in the state.

Some lawyers think Crowson's suit is a stretch. Federal law does not impose on companies a specific duty to notify consumers when tainted meat is recalled under the direction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), as was the case here. Also, Crowson and her family, and the class she seeks to represent, are suing based on fear (and possible future harm), not current illness. Moreover, the chance they will actually get Mad Cow Disease some time in the future are apparently remote.

Nevertheless, the lawsuit has strong intuitive appeal: QFC could have saved the Crowsons and others like them a lot of worry, and perhaps sleepless nights, with what appears would have been minimal effort, using information at its digital fingertips. And the court has already once refused to dismiss it - finding that there were sufficient factual questions about the beef and about QFC's responsibility to the Crowsons, to merit further exploration of the evidence, through discovery and in the courtroom.

Regardless of the outcome of Crowson's suit, it underscores the need for retailers and policymakers to examine what sort of responsibilities come with private data gathering under loyalty card schemes.

The Lawsuit: The Chronology of Facts Alleged, and the Loyalty Card at Issue

On December 22 and 23, 2003, Crowson bought ground beef from a QFC store. Also on December 23, 2003, the USDA recalled Washington beef after it confirmed that a cow slaughtered in Washington had been infected with Mad Cow Disease. But Crowson says QFC did not pull the affected meat from its shelves until December 24, and did not post signs in its stores announcing the recall until December 27. By then, the Crowson family had eaten the meat.

Crowson states that she only learned of the recall by reading an article in her local newspaper. She said she subsequently called the supermarket chain, then faxed QFC a letter asking that her purchase be traced through her QFC Advantage card. On January 10, she was notified that her ground beef purchase was indeed from the recalled batch.

Crowson says that what QFC allegedly did in response to the recall - pulling the beef from shelves the next day, and posting signs three days after that -- was far from enough. She says it should have immediately warned customers who had bought possibly tainted meat through newspaper, radio and television advertising -- and by contacting individually those who, like her, had Advantage cards. Its failure to do so, she says, is what makes the company liable to her and other shoppers.

The Advantage Card is known in the retail industry as a customer "loyalty card" - providing discounts on specific items, in exchange for consumer information that will aid in better tailoring the company's marketing efforts. Combining the data from one's loyalty card application with data from other commercial databases or public records (for examples, mortgage records, or court filings) can often allow a very specific profile of each consumer.

Some states limit the types of information that a grocery store can collect from you when you register for a loyalty card. For example, California state law prohibits a grocery store from requiring that you turn over your social security or your driver's license number.

Companies, of course, stress the potential savings that might result from use of a loyalty card. Consider, for instance, the sales pitch on the QFC website it reads: "If you don't have a QFC Advantage Card, you're missing out! The Advantage Card is a powerful new way to save on the groceries you buy every day. It gives you the best of all possible worlds: premium quality, superb service and lower prices. That's something no other grocery store can match. So make sure you take advantage of the big savings."

Privacy advocates complain that loyalty cards result in the improper use - and, often, sale to third parties - of customers' private information. QFC apparently doesn't sell customers' data to third parties, however. Its website promises that "QFC will not release your name to any list service or manufacturer, and that such information will be held in the strictest of confidence-even within our company."

Privacy advocates also warn, however, that even if third-party sales of data are not allowed, the data compiled can always be accessed with a subpoena or warrant and used against the customer in court proceedings. Meanwhile, consumer advocates claim that certain loyalty cards don't really offer the savings they promise. Nevertheless, numerous stores employ loyalty cards.

Turning the Privacy Debate on Its Head: With Great Information, Comes Great Responsibility?

The Crowson lawsuit turns the privacy debate on its head. Typically, privacy advocates ask retailers to safeguard the personal information they collect about their shoppers. In this case, in contrast, plaintiff is asking that QFC delve into its database to notify her about a meat recall.

QFC does this very thing if a consumer loses his or her keys with an Advantage Card attached to them - returning the keys free of charge. So Crowson's attorney, Steve Berman, asks: "If they can contact you over a lost set of car keys, why couldn't they contact you and tell you that the beef you purchased could kill you?"

According to some news reports, QFC was reluctant to call customers regarding the recall based on privacy concerns. But in this case, the concerns seem misplaced. No privacy law is violated when a consumer communicates with the customer herself regarding private information - indeed, every offer the customer receives is, in a sense, this kind of communication. When the customer is receiving personalized discounts based on her purchase history, why can't she receive personalized health and safety warnings based on that history, too?

Was There a Duty to Warn Here?

From the law's perspective, the question will be not whether QFC ideally should have warned the Crowsons - of course it should have. The question will be if it had a legal duty to do so. Such a duty would come from either the common law of torts, which allows claims where there is a duty to behave reasonably to prevent foreseeable harm to others. . Or it might come from the Washington product liability statute - which, as noted above, creates a "duty to warn" in certain situations.

And of course, if there is no current duty, the legislature may see fit to pass a statute creating such a duty. :It may seem more prudent, however, for retailers to voluntarily assume such a responsibility. When companies benefit from collecting customer information, shouldn't they also assume a duty to protect customers from known risks associated with that very information? Some risks, of course, may be a matter of opinion. But this one was not: The fact of the risk was acknowledged by the USDA recall of the meat. With this kind of clear notice of the risk, it seems that QFC either does - or ought to - have a duty to protect customers from this risk.

Of course, should a retailer not wish to take on this responsibility, it can also change its loyalty program. QFC and other retailers could still track consumer purchases without asking them for personally identifiable information.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Anita Ramasastry is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle and a Director of the Shidler Center for Law, Commerce & Technology.

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040805.html

Family Sues Grocer over BSE Recalled Beef

A family who claims they ate beef linked to the nation’s only known case of mad cow disease recently filed a class action lawsuit against Quality Food Centers (QFC), claiming the grocery store chain negligently exposed them and others to “highly hazardous” meat and did not properly notify them that they had bought it. Attorneys for Jill Crowson filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court on behalf of her family and possibly hundreds of other customers who unwittingly bought and consumed beef potentially exposed to mad cow disease. The lawsuit is believed to be the first stemming from this country’s only confirmed case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which was detected in a slaughtered dairy cow on December 23. Neither officials at Quality Food Centers’ Bellevue headquarters, or Kroger’s, the company’s Ohio-based corporate parent, could be reached for comment about the lawsuit. The suit contends the family bought and later ate ground beef from their local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern’s Moses Lake Meats on December 9 and included meat from the diseased cow. The beef was later shipped to wholesalers and retailers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada. On December 23, after government scientists confirmed the infection, businesses began pulling potentially affected beef from their shelves under a voluntary recall. The family’s suit claims that, although QFC was aware of the recall, the store did not begin pulling the recalled beef from about 40 of its stores that carried it until December 24. The suit also claims that the company did not try to warn customers about the recalled beef until days later, and only then with small, inconspicuous signs inside the stores. Steve Berman, the family’s attorney, said the company had “a duty to warn” consumers who bought the beef under terms of the Washington Product Liability Act. Lawyers for the family say they believe hundreds, if not thousands, of QFC customers, and those of other stores, likely ate recalled beef - the reason why Berman filed their legal claim as a class action. A U.S. Department of Agriculture official last week said up to 17,000 pounds of meat affected by the recall likely was eaten or thrown out by customers. USDA officials have repeatedly said the risk from eating muscle cuts from an infected cow - the likely cut of meat processed and sold for hamburger in the recall - is extremely low. The family seeks damages for emotional distress and medical monitoring costs.

http://www.southwestmeat.org/newsletters/archive/March1504.pdf

see also ;

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/

OF INTEREST BSE AND BSE COHORTS

U.K.

FINAL REPORT ON BSE CONFIRMED IN AN ANIMAL BORN ON 3 OCTOBER 2001 & TWO COHORT ANIMALS BORN ON 28 SEPTEMBER 2001 & 1 MAY 2002 IN A PEMBROKESHIRE HERD

snip...

Thirty-nine cohort animals1 and one offspring animal (born January 2004) were identified and effectively restricted within 24 hours of suspicion of the index case. The cohort and offspring animals were slaughtered following confirmation of the index case. Thirty-four cohorts were slaughtered in an OTMS abattoir on 12 May 2005. The offspring animal and five of the cohorts were slaughtered on farm. All the cohort animals were tested for BSE. Two of the animals slaughtered in the OTMS abattoir tested positive on BioRad ELISA. These homebred pedigree Holstein Friesian cows were born on 28 September 2001 and 1 May 2002, and were aged 43 and 36 months respectively at slaughter. These cases were confirmed on 27 May 2005 following positive Hybrid Western Blot (2001), OIE Western Blot (both), Immunohistochemistry (both) and Histopathology (2002) results. Where possible, samples from the BioRad negative cohorts were also subjected to further testing, all with negative results.

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/atoz/bse/documents/2001-02barb-finalreport.pdf

ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS

39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005, mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the 1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95% confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform

14

© SEAC 2005

distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1 quadruplet).

40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002 but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July 2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All 3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September 1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.

41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.

42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July 2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for the BARB cases.

43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.

Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4 years in the feed bin.

44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.

snip...

http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf

AUGUST 2010

let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.

This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$

Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee The possible impacts and consequences for public health, trade and agriculture of the Government’s decision to relax import restrictions on beef Final report June 2010

2.65 At its hearing on 14 May 2010, the committee heard evidence from Dr Alan Fahey who has recently submitted a thesis on the clinical neuropsychiatric, epidemiological and diagnostic features of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.48 Dr Fahey told the committee of his concerns regarding the lengthy incubation period for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, the inadequacy of current tests and the limited nature of our current understanding of this group of diseases.49

2.66 Dr Fahey also told the committee that in the last two years a link has been established between forms of atypical CJD and atypical BSE. Dr Fahey said that: They now believe that those atypical BSEs overseas are in fact causing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They were not sure if it was due to mad sheep disease or a different form. If you look in the textbooks it looks like this is just arising by itself. But in my research I have a summary of a document which states that there has never been any proof that sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease has arisen de novo—has arisen of itself. There is no proof of that. The recent research is that in fact it is due to atypical forms of mad cow disease which have been found across Europe, have been found in America and have been found in Asia. These atypical forms of mad cow disease typically have even longer incubation periods than the classical mad cow disease.50

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/mad_cows/report/report.pdf

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html

Tuesday, August 03, 2010

Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy: A new sporadic disease of the prion protein

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/variably-protease-sensitive-prionopathy.html

Monday, August 9, 2010

Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy: A new sporadic disease of the prion protein or just more PRIONBALONEY ?

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/variably-protease-sensitive-prionopathy.html

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, March 16, 2010

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Hansard Import restrictions on beef FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010 AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Proof Committee Hansard

RRA&T 2 Senate Friday, 5 February 2010

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

[9.03 am]

BELLINGER, Mr Brad, Chairman, Australian Beef Association

CARTER, Mr John Edward, Director, Australian Beef Association

CHAIR—Welcome. Would you like to make an opening statement?

Mr Bellinger—Thank you. The ABA stands by its submission, which we made on 14 December last year, that the decision made by the government to allow the importation of beef from BSE affected countries is politically based, not science based. During this hearing we will bring forward compelling new evidence to back up this statement. When I returned to my property after the December hearing I received a note from an American citizen. I will read a small excerpt from the mail he sent me in order to reinforce the dangers of allowing the importation of beef from BSE affected countries. I have done a number of press releases on this topic, and this fellow has obviously picked my details up from the internet. His name is Terry Singeltary and he is from Bacliff, Texas. He states, and rightfully so:

You should be worried. Please let me explain. I’ve kept up with the mad cow saga for 12 years today, on December 14th 1997, some four months post voluntary and partial mad cow feed ban in the USA, I lost my mother to the Heidenhain variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). I know this is just another phenotype of the infamous sporadic CJDs. Here in the USA, when USA sheep scrapie was transmitted to USA bovine, the agent was not UK BSE—it was a different strain. So why then would human TSE from USA cattle look like UK CJD from UK BSE? It would not. So this accentuates that the science is inconclusive still on this devastating disease. He goes on to state:

The OIE— the International Organisation of Epizootics, the arm of the WTO— is a failed global agent that in my opinion is bought off via bogus regulations for global trade and industry reps. I have done this all these years for nothing but the truth. I am a consumer, I eat meat, but I do not have to sit idly by and see the ignorance and greed of it all while countless numbers of humans and animals are being exposed to the TSE agents. All the USA is interested in is trade, nothing else matters.

Even Dr Stanley Prusiner, who incidentally won the Nobel Health Prize in 1997 for his work on the prion—he invented the word ‘prion’, or it came from him—states:

The BSC policy was set up for one purpose only, trade—the illegal trading of all strains of TSE globally throughout North America, which is home to CBSC, IBSC and HBSC, many scrapie strains and two strains of CJD to date. (please note typo error, those should have read cBSE, lBSE, and hBSE...tss)

I would also like, while I have the opportunity, to explain the beef-off-the-shelves myth. At the first Senate hearing on 14 December, it was explained that the reason why they allowed BSC beef into Australia was the beef-off-the-shelves policy, whereby if we found a case of BSC in Australia they would have to recall all—

Friday, 5 February 2010 Senate RRA&T 3

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

Senator HEFFERNAN—Which of course is total BS.

Mr Bellinger—Correct. This is written in the FSANZ document—Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Why isn’t this same policy in New Zealand? It is not—it is only in Australia. We are the only country in the world to have this idiotic policy. So we again call for the tabling of the WTO obligations paperwork. We do not believe that exists.

snip...see full text 110 pages ;

http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S12742.pdf

for those interested, please see much more here ;

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2010/03/commonwealth-of-australia-hansard.html

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

(SEE BEEF PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO AUSTRALIA FROM USA...TSS)

AUSTRALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS BSE RISK (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2009 and USA export risk factor for BSE to Australia

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/07/australian-questionnaire-to-assess-bse.html

Saturday, August 14, 2010

USA NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM (BEEF IMPORT EXPORT BSE RISK THERE FROM)

US denies it's illegally sending beef to Australia ?

Friday, 13/08/2010

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/08/usa-non-species-coding-system-beef.html

Saturday, June 19, 2010

U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html

Sunday, August 15, 2010

ATYPICAL BSE NOW LINKED TO CAUSING SPORADIC CJD OVERSEAS Commonwealth of Australia

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/atypical-bse-now-linked-to-causing.html

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

Spontaneous generation of mammalian prions

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2010/07/spontaneous-generation-of-mammalian.html

P.9.21

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

SCRAPIE CANADA UPDATE Current as of 2010-07-31 The following table lists sheep flocks and/or goat herds confirmed to be infected with scrapie in Canada in 2010.

Current as of: 2010-07-31

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/08/scrapie-canada-update-current-as-of.html

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html

FRIENDLY FIRE FROM ALL OF THE ABOVE ;

Wednesday, August 18, 2010

Incidence of CJD Deaths Reported by CJD-SS in Canada as of July 31, 2010

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/incidence-of-cjd-deaths-reported-by-cjd.html

Monday, August 9, 2010

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)

(please watch and listen to the video and the scientist speaking about atypical BSE and sporadic CJD and listen to Professor Aguzzi)

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html

Thursday, August 12, 2010

USA Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for vCJD, were distributed July-August 2010

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/usa-blood-products-collected-from-donor.html

Friday, August 20, 2010

Heidenhain Variant of Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease With the Co-Occurrence of Two Different Types of Prion Protein

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/heidenhain-variant-of-sporadic.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010

2010-02-10T10:09:00.000-08:00

NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS

On February 5, 2010, USDA announced a new, flexible framework for animal disease traceability in the United States.

The framework will provide the basic tenets of an improved animal disease traceability capability in the United States. USDA’s efforts will:

•Only apply to animals moved in interstate commerce; •Be administered by the States and Tribal Nations to provide more flexibility; •Encourage the use of lower-cost technology; and •Be implemented transparently through federal regulations and the full rulemaking process. USDA is committed to working in partnership with States, Tribal Nations and industry in the coming months to address many of the details of this framework, and is establishing a Secretary's Advisory Committee on Animal Health to address specific issues, such as confidentiality and liability.

For more information about the new framework, please read the following documents:

•USDA Announces New Framework for Animal Disease Traceability(En Español)

•Questions and Answers: New Animal Disease Traceability Framework

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/

Bloomberg

February 05, 2010, 02:26 PM EST

U.S. Cuts Animal-Tracking Plan Created After Mad Cow (Update3)

(Adds export figures, mad cow disease-related losses, and European Union tracking system starting in seventh paragraph.)

By Daniel Enoch and Whitney McFerron

Feb. 5 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. is scrapping a national system to track livestock from birth to slaughter as industry opposition led to the failure of a voluntary program created after cases of mad cow disease emerged starting in 2003.

snip...see full text ;

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-02-05/usda-to-limit-animal-id-plan-to-interstate-moves-update1-.html

USDA announces plans to revise animal ID system Issue Date: February 10, 2010

By Ching Lee Assistant Editor

Responding to criticism from what it called a "vast majority" of ranchers who spoke out at public forums, the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced last week it is revising its policy on the National Animal Identification System in favor of a more "flexible, coordinated approach" to animal disease traceability.

U.S. Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack said the new policy allows states to administer their own trace-back program that focuses only on animals that move across state lines.

Rather than mandating a national, one-size-fits-all system for all producers, the USDA would work with states to adopt specific methods that work best for their local needs, he added.

The changes come after a series of public meetings last year in which producers and other stakeholders raised concerns about the old system, including cost, confidentiality, liability and privacy. Some groups also complained that the system benefits only large-scale producers and that the animal ID system is unnecessary because existing animal identification systems are sufficient.

Citing the feedback, Vilsack said "it is apparent that a new strategy for animal disease traceability is needed."

The ability to identify and track livestock became a top priority for USDA following the nation's first case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in 2003. The department proposed the system in 2004 and subsequently spent more than $120 million trying to implement it. However, only 36 percent of producers to date have signed up for the program.

While many producers say they recognize the importance of having a system in place to protect animal health and enhance disease control, the USDA plan to tag and track millions of livestock ignited opposition and controversy among ranchers across the nation.

Vilsack said under his new plan, USDA would work with states to create new federal rules and a basic blueprint for the new system. But states would ultimately decide how they want to design their program to meet federal standards.

He said he plans to re-establish an advisory committee with state animal health leaders to assist in evaluating commodity-based animal disease traceability approaches. ...SNIP...END

FULL TEXT ;

http://www.cfbf.com/agalert/AgAlertStory.cfm?ID=1478&ck=83CDCEC08FBF90370FCF53BDD56604FF

SEE what old Ron has to say now, after he let the mad cows out the barn door ;

Some Concerned with USDA's Decision to Scrap NAIS

02/08/2010 from NAFB News Service

Veterinarians and a Bush-era USDA official are expressing reservations about USDA’s decision to dump the National Animal Identification System.

CEO Ron DeHaven says the American Veterinary Medical Association cannot endorse Ag Secretary Tom Vilsack's new approach to animal disease traceability because there are simply too many unanswered questions. “As I understand it they will let each state and tribal nation more or less develop their own program. So I’m concerned about interoperability between fifty or more different systems. Will one state be able to talk to another state as an animal moves through interstate commerce?"

According to DeHaven, who was USDA’s Chief Veterinarian when the first U.S. BSE case was discovered in 2003, politics trumped animal disease control. "In my estimation we’ve allowed those political issues to get in the way of what is a much more important issue, and that is our ability to rapidly trace animals to contain and eliminate a disease outbreak. It’s not a partisan issue, but I think both administrations have been caving to this public resistance, which in my estimation, while it may be important, it pales in comparison to the economic impact of a major disease outbreak."

Bruce Knight, USDA’s Marketing and Regulatory Under Secretary in the final years of the Bush Administration, fears that abandoning the NAIS model will undercut U.S. efforts to obtain a negligible BSE risk rating from the World Organization for Animal Health.

USDA estimates the new animal disease traceability framework will take 18 months to two years to create and implement. But Jay Truitt of Policy Solutions, a Washington-based lobbying firm, says it’ll take a lot longer than that, maybe 4 or 5 years, making it more difficult to lift remaining BSE-related restrictions on U.S. beef exports.

Truitt, formerly Vice President of Government Affairs at the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, wasn’t surprised by Vilsack’s decision to scrap NAIS. He described beef cattle producer participation in the program as "pitiful."

http://www.hoosieragtoday.com/wire/news/00222_naisscrap_223049.php

see more of Ron here ;

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/02/report-on-testing-ruminants-for-tses-in.html

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html

Remarks

Bruce I. Knight, Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs FFA Cooperative Agreement Signing Washington, DC

June 4, 2007

SNIP...

We all understand that the goal for NAIS first and foremost is to protect animal health. It's designed to help producers safeguard their flocks and herds, to protect their neighbors and to preserve their profits.

NAIS also builds confidence in the health and wholesomeness of U.S. livestock. Further, the animal ID program enables us to meet the international obligations we face in the world market. Having the system in place will smooth the way for livestock exports.

OIE Designation

As you know, there's been significant concern about BSE around the world. But we're making progress in reassuring our trading partners that we have the safeguards in place to ensure that the products we sell are safe and healthful to eat.

Just two weeks ago, the OIE-the World Organization for Animal Health-awarded the U.S. a formal classification of "controlled risk" for BSE. As Secretary Johanns put it, "That classification confirms what we have always contended-that U.S. regulatory controls are effective and that U.S. fresh beef and beef products from cattle of all ages can be safely traded due to our interlocking safeguards."

The controlled risk classification is essentially an international clean bill of health for our national cattle herd. It's a determination based on a scientific assessment of risk using internationally agreed upon standards.

Any nation that recognizes the OIE standards now has no scientific reason to block imports of U.S. beef-of any age. Eventually, it should put an end to the need for export verification programs.

The key is for our trading partners to adopt the OIE standards as their own standards for safe trade. And we must do the same.

Conclusion

We are moving forward to expand markets and to ensure the health of U.S. herds and flocks with the voluntary NAIS. Today, we welcome FFA as they join with us as partners to encourage farmers and ranchers to take the first step and register their premises.

SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/speeches/content/2007/06/document/FFA-NAIS-SigningFinal%206-4-07.doc

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/downloads/NAIS-UserGuide.pdf

National Animal Identification System (NAIS)

NAIS: AT A GLANCE

What is (WAS...TSS) NAIS?

Simply put, NAIS is a modern, streamlined information system that helps producers and animal health officials respond quickly and effectively to animal disease events in the United States. The NAIS program—a voluntary State-Federal-Industry partnership—is beneficial because it helps us protect U.S. livestock and poultry from disease spread, maintain consumer confidence in our food supply, and retain access to domestic and foreign markets.

USDA is not requiring participation in the program. NAIS can help producers protect the health and marketability of their animals—but the choice to participate is theirs.

Animal health officials across the country agree that premises registration, the foundation of NAIS, is a necessary first step to achieving these goals. Premises information ensures that producers will be notified quickly when a disease event might impact their area or the species of animals they have. In an animal health emergency, we cannot help producers protect their animals if we do not know they are there. By voluntarily registering their premises and providing contact information, producers will ensure that they receive the information they need—when they need it most—to protect their animals and their investment. In an emergency, animal health officials will be able to quickly locate at-risk animals and take precise actions to address the situation, minimize hardships, and speed disease eradication efforts as much as possible.

The voluntary NAIS also encompasses animal identification and animal movement tracing systems. These components are currently being refined by NAIS’ industry and private sector partners. While the focus today is on premises registration, animal owners should know that the other components of NAIS will be additional options for them when they’re ready to make decisions about what level of participation best suits their needs.

USDA is required by law to protect individuals’ private information. Regardless of the level of participation animal owners choose, the voluntary NAIS is limited in terms of the type and quantity of information maintained by the Federal Government. At the Federal level, the system will hold and maintain only minimal premises information. Beyond the premises registration system, USDA will not “own” any additional data on participants in the system. If USDA needs animal movement and location information to respond to an animal health emergency, data will be requested from the private and State databases where it is held. Federal law protects individuals’ private information and confidential business information from public disclosure.

FULL TEXT 74 PAGES ;

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/downloads/NAIS-UserGuide.pdf

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2009/12/nais-cool-from-farm-to-fork-mad-cow.html

Friday, March 13, 2009

NAIS comments NCBA and R-Calf Wednesday, March 11, 2009 – 10:30 a.m. Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry — Public Hearing

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html

Saturday, August 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html

48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???

NOT in your lifetime !

8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

February 10, 2010

Greetings,

IN my opinion, i think we need NAIS. i think as a consumer, we have a right to this information. as a Country importing our product, they have a right to know, it should be law. it should be mandatory that when an animal disease or human disease there from break out, the animal and or it's product can be traced. and as a producer of that product, if you are too worried about confidentiality, you are trying to hide something, then you should not be in the business. how in the world can knowing from where a cow comes from i.e. traceability, be such a threat to the producer, unless they simply want to hide something? in 2010, the USA, in relations to cattle identification and tracing, could not trace their @ss if they had both hands on it, in my opinion, and going by past history of the last two documented mad cows. the USA has been discussing this for over a decade. I don't understand it, all these other Country's that have some sort of Animal Traceability in place, they are and have been trying to eradicate BSE, that have had a feed ban in place, that have been abiding by it, testing in numbers to find and eradicate the TSEs, and the USA just seems to be doing the opposite in many ways it seems to me. if the USA is not going to trace it's meat products, why should other Country's trace theirs? The USA is BSE GBR III, all of North America is BSE GBR III (with all the evidence of breaches in the bse feed ban, the breaches in the BSE surveillance program, i personally believe it is BSE GBR IV). The problem is, the USDA just never accepted it (BSE GBR III), and then changed the rules with the BSE MRR. this BSE MRR policy literally trashed 30 years of attempted BSE GBR eradication of this disease. What about other trading partners with the U.S.A. that DO HAVE a traceability system. i think Australia is getting ready to roll over and get MRR'ed, therefore they too will just be another victim of allowing all strains of Typical and Atypical BSE/TSE into their Country via the USDA OIE BSE MRR policy, a policy of trading all strains of mad cow disease globally. The O.I.E., by bending over for the USDA with this damn BSE MRR policy, has sold their sole to the devil, and in doing so, sold yours too. ...

remember, and do not forget what the Honorable Nobel Peace Prize winner of the PRION i.e. Stanley Prusiner said ;

THEY DON'T WANT TO KNOW ! ABSOLUTE IGNORANCE, ALL THAT MATTERS IS TRADE...

AFTER THE COW IN CANADA...LEVEL OF ABSOLUTE IGNORANCE, OF WHAT HE WAS TRYTING TO CONTAIN...

THE ENTIRE POLICY WAS DRIVEN BY WHAT THE USA WAS TELLING HIM TO DO...SO NOW AFTER SOME TIME HAS PASSED...

SO NOW AFTER TIME HAS PASSED IT'S O.K. FOR BONELESS BEEF PRODUCTS FROM UNDER 30 MONTHS TO BE EXPORTED FROM CANADA TO THE UNITED STATES, THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERED...

YES, I THINK THAT PRIONS ARE BAD TO EAT, AND YOU CAN DIE FROM THEM...

http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html

Analysis of Data on Presumed Dead and Untraceable Animals

CEAH performed an analysis of the minimum estimated ages of those COI that were classified as either presumed dead or untraceable to determine the likely disposition of those animals based on their ages. Moreover, CEAH performed an analysis of the likely disposition of the one calf that was classified as untraceable during the investigation.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/03/nais-comments-ncba-and-r-calf-wednesday.html

WE know that the FDA mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997 was nothing but ink on paper. there is still animal protein in commerce in the USA being fed out to cattle and other livestock as we speak. see a few warning letters and or recalls here ;

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-99-25-detention-without.html

WE also know that the USDA certified dead stock downer cow school lunch program NSLP, fed these most high risk cattle for BSE and mad cow disease and other deadly pathogens to our children all across our Nation for over 4 YEARS, you can see this here ;

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/09/suit-meatpacker-used-downer-cows-for-4.html

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Establishing a Fully Integrated National Food Safety System with Strengthened Inspection, Laboratory and Response Capacity Draft 09/24/09

http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/2010/01/establishing-fully-integrated-national.html

Friday, January 29, 2010 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/14th-international-congress-on.html

Beef imports from BSE nations not traced

19:16 AEST Mon Feb 8 2010 ago By Simon Jenkins

Beef imported to Australia from countries where there has been an outbreak of mad cow disease will not be traced back to individual farms, a Senate inquiry has been told.

Yet beef farms in Australia are subject to full traceability through the National Livestock Identification System.

The double standard drew the ire of coalition senators during a Senate estimates hearing in Canberra on Monday.

"How on earth ... can we be sure about the beef that's coming from that (overseas) property?" Nationals senator Fiona Nash asked the chief veterinary officer from the government's Biosecurity Service Group.

Asked whether there would be individual assessments of traceability, Dr Andy Carroll replied: "No."

Traceability will be determined on a country-to-country basis, and administered through Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FANZ).

SNIP...END...TSS

http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/1009496/beef-imports-from-bse-nations-not-traced

for those interested, please see ;

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/05/oie-upgrades-japans-bse-status-to.html

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html

Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=090000648027c28e

Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf

Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST

August 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;

PROPOSED RULES

Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:

Whole cuts of boneless beef from-

Japan,

48494-48500 [05-16422]

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=0900006480086ebc&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw6

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed

PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html

Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM

Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS SUBMISSION

snip...

ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear with me)

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.

These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

snip... 48 pages...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

Sent: Friday, January 29, 2010 3:23 PM

Subject: 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

18.173 page 189

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.

http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf

http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml

From: xxxx
To: Terry Singeltary
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 9:09 AM Subject: 14th ICID - abstract accepted for 'International Scientific Exchange'

Your preliminary abstract number: 670

Dear Mr. Singeltary,

On behalf of the Scientific Committee, I am pleased to inform you that your abstract

'Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009'

WAS accepted for inclusion in the INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE (ISE) section of the 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases. Accordingly, your abstract will be included in the "Intl. Scientific Exchange abstract CD-rom" of the Congress which will be distributed to all participants.

Abstracts accepted for INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE are NOT PRESENTED in the oral OR poster sessions.

Your abstract below was accepted for: INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE

#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

Author: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US

Topic: Emerging Infectious Diseases Preferred type of presentation: International Scientific Exchange

This abstract has been ACCEPTED.

#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

Authors: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US

Title: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

Body: Background

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods

12 years independent research of available data

Results

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries.

I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

Keywords: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Prion

http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/

http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf

Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

snip...

I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.

Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards,

Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

END...TSS

I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html

snip...full text ;

Friday, January 29, 2010

14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/14th-international-congress-on.html

Sunday, January 17, 2010

BSE USA feed inspection violations 01/01/2009 to 01/17/2010 FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/bse-usa-feed-inspection-violations.html

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

CVM's OR Develops New PCR-Based Method for Testing Animal Feed

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/cvms-or-develops-new-pcr-based-method.html

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html

my comments to PLosone here ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd

Thursday, February 4, 2010

SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Draft Minutes of the 103rd Meeting held on 24th November 2009

http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2010/02/spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

The Honorable Ms. Kim Min-sun Anti-US Beef Actress Prevails in Court

http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2010/02/honorable-ms-kim-min-sun-anti-us-beef.html

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/r-calf-40-groups-disagree-with-usdas.html

Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html

Sunday, September 6, 2009

MAD COW USA 1997 SECRET VIDEO

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html

U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ? see video at bottom

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html

DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN see video

http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html

Thursday, January 07, 2010

Scrapie and Nor-98 Scrapie November 2009 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2010 and FISCAL YEAR 2008

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/01/scrapie-and-nor-98-scrapie-november.html

Monday, December 14, 2009

Similarities between Forms of Sheep Scrapie and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Are Encoded by Distinct Prion Types

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/12/similarities-between-forms-of-sheep.html

Friday, February 05, 2010

New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review

http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-variant-creutzfelt-jakob-disease.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE

2009-12-15T12:10:00.000-08:00

Greetings,

I do not understand the logic behind the fear to NAIS and COOL ?

I really don't.

Everything about us is traceable by the Government. Birth certificate, driver's license, social security number, your deed to your house, property, house number, car title, all the parts of your car are traceable, even each owner of the car since it rolled off the assembly line, boat, motor, etc. etc.

SO why all the concern on traceability of the food we eat ?

WHY does most folks in the industry fear this so much $$$

The fear of the NAIS and or COOL seems to be that no one wants their product to be traceable, because of fear of litigation from contaminated food, rather than the excuse of not wanting the Government messing in your business. Just my opinion.

An example would be the California mad cow beef recall (see history below), that eventually humans were exposed to suspect mad cow beef. A lot of folks. Same as with the Dead Stock Downer Cow School Lunch Program. These kids all across our Nation, for four years and probably longer, were fed the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease from dead stock downer cows, where the largest beef recall (at the time) took place, of which, a great deal were already consumed by our children. With an incubation period of 50+ years in some cases, in others much shorter, who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ?

Subject: Public Meeting Proposed Rule on the Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees During Meat or Poultry Product Recalls [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0009] Date: April 21, 2006 at 12:03 pm PST

[Federal Register: April 6, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 66)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 17384-17385] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr06ap06-16]

======================================================================== Proposed Rules Federal Register ________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================

[[Page 17384]]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Food Safety and Inspection Service

9 CFR Part 390

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0009]

Public Meeting To Discuss the Proposed Rule on the Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees During Meat or Poultry Product Recalls

AGENCY: Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) will hold a public meeting to solicit comments on its proposal to make available to the public lists of the retail consignees of meat and poultry products that have voluntarily been recalled by a federally inspected meat or poultry establishment if product has been distributed to the retail level. FSIS has proposed to routinely post these retail consignee lists on its Web site as they are developed by the Agency during its recall verification activities. There will be a five-minute time limit for each commenter who presents at the meeting.

DATES: The public meeting will be held on April 24, 2006, from 9:30 a.m. to 12 p.m. Registration for the meeting will begin at 9 a.m.

ADDRESSES: The public meeting will take place in the conference room at the south end of the U.S. Department of Agriculture cafeteria located in the South Building, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC, 20250. Meeting attendees must enter the South Building at Wing 2, C Street, SW. FSIS will finalize an agenda on or before the meeting date and will post it on the FSIS Internet Web page http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News/Meetings_&_Events/. Interested persons may submit comments on this

notice. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods: Federal eRulemaking Portal: This Web site provides the ability to type short comments directly into the comment field on this Web page or attach a file for lengthier comments. Go to http://www.regulations.gov and, in the ``Search for Open Regulations'' box,

select ``Food Safety and Inspection Service'' from the agency drop-down menu, and then click on ``Submit.'' In the Docket ID column, select FDMS Docket Number FSIS-2006-0009 to submit or view public comments and to view supporting and related materials available electronically. This docket can be viewed using the ``Advanced Search'' function in Regulations.gov. Mail, including floppy disks or CD-ROM's, and hand- or courier-delivered items: Send to Docket Clerk, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, 300 12th Street, SW., Room 102 Cotton Annex, Washington, DC 20250. Electronic mail: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov. All submissions received by mail and electronic mail must include the Agency name and docket number FSIS-2006-0009. All comments submitted in response to this notice will be available for public inspection in the FSIS Docket Room at the address listed above between 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. The comments also will be posted to the regulations.gov Web site and on the Agency's Web site at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/2006_Notices_Index/index.asp .

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Victoria A. Levine, Program Analyst, Regulations and Petitions Policy Staff, Office of Policy, Program, and Employee Development, Room 112, Cotton Annex, 300 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20250-3700; Telephone (202) 720-5627, e-mail victoria.levine@fsis.usda.gov. Pre-registration for this meeting is

required. To pre-register, please contact Diane Jones at (202) 720-9692 or by e-mail at Diane.Jones@fsis.usda.gov. Persons requiring a sign language interpreter or special accommodations should contact Ms. Jones as soon as possible.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 7, 2006, FSIS published in the Federal Register a proposed rule titled Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees During Meat or Poultry Product Recalls (71 FR 11326). In the preamble to the proposed rule, FSIS indicated that it would hold a public meeting to solicit comments on the issue raised in the proposal. Therefore, FSIS is holding this public meeting to solicit comment on FSIS' proposal to amend the federal meat and poultry products inspection regulations to provide that the Agency will make available to the public lists of the retail consignees of meat and poultry products that have been voluntarily recalled by a federally inspected meat or poultry products establishment if product has been distributed to the retail level. FSIS has proposed to routinely post these retail consignee lists on its website as they are developed by the Agency during its recall verification activities. FSIS proposed this action because it believes that the efficiency of recalls will be improved if there is more information available as to where products that have been recalled were sold. By providing consumers this information, FSIS believes that consumers will be more likely to identify and return such products to those locations or to dispose of them. This action will apply only to meat and poultry products.

Additional Public Notification

Public awareness of all segments of rulemaking and policy development is important. Consequently, in an effort to ensure that the public and in particular minorities, women, and persons with disabilities, are aware of this notice, FSIS will announce it on-line through the FSIS Web page located at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/2006_Notices_Index/index.asp .

The Regulations.gov website is the central online rulemaking portal of the United States government. It is being offered as a public service to increase participation in the Federal government's regulatory activities. FSIS participates in Regulations.gov and will accept comments on documents published on the site. The site allows visitors to search by keyword or Department or Agency for rulemakings that allow for public comment. Each entry provides a quick link to a comment form so that visitors can type in their comments and submit them to FSIS. The website is located at http://www.regulations.gov.

[[Page 17385]]

FSIS also will make copies of this Federal Register publication available through the FSIS Constituent Update, which is used to provide information regarding FSIS policies, procedures, regulations, Federal Register notices, FSIS public meetings, recalls, and other types of information that could affect or would be of interest to our constituents and stakeholders. The update is communicated via Listserv, a free e-mail subscription service consisting of industry, trade, and farm groups, consumer interest groups, allied health professionals, scientific professionals, and other individuals who have requested to be included. The update also is available on the FSIS web page. Through Listserv and the web page, FSIS is able to provide information to a much broader, more diverse audience. In addition, FSIS offers an email subscription service which provides an automatic and customized notification when popular pages are updated, including Federal Register publications and related documents. This service is available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/news_and_events/email_subscription/ and allows FSIS customers to sign up

for subscription options across eight categories. Options range from recalls to export information to regulations, directives and notices. Customers can add or delete subscriptions themselves and have the option to password protect their account.

Done in Washington, DC: April 3, 2006. Barbara J. Masters, Administrator. [FR Doc. E6-5013 Filed 4-5-06; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410-DM-P

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Frame/FrameRedirect.asp?main=http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/2006-0009.htm

Greetings,

I would kindly like to comment on the Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees During Meat or Poultry Product Recalls (71 FR 11326). I am in full support of this, and more, i.e. COOL. It all should have been mandatory long ago. you have consumers that are suspicious, and rightly so. just look what happened in California and Washington, with that mad cow and it's cohorts. i am talking total open honesty from farm to fork, mandatory traceability from the time that calf hits the ground to the time it hits the fork and all feed/drug records to go with it, recorded properly, and should be mandatory. WE have humans dying from human TSE, and we have ample animal TSE in the food production line to account for some of those human TSE. The USA has the most documented animal TSE in the world. WE must not flounder any longer. THE BSE MRR policy the Bush Administration, along with Mexico and Canada, with the grace from the OIE to go ahead, set back the eradication of BSE, set it back to the stone ages, pre-90. The BSE GBR risk assessments must be adhered to, and strengthened to include all animal TSE. WHEN the OIE chose to ignore the BSE GBR risk assessments, to go with the more industry friendly BSE MRR policy, they sold there soul to the devil as far as i am concerned, (never did much good anyway, all one has to do is look at all the documented BSE countries now that went by the OIE very weak BSE surveillance guidelines to begin with),

* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04

October 2004 FOOD SAFETY USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food

snip...

Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs To examine the voluntary recall of beef products associated with the December 2003 discovery of an animal infected with BSE, we analyzed the distribution lists USDA collected from companies and the verification checks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating the location and volume of recalled beef that reached different levels of the distribution chain. We compared the distribution lists and verification checks to identify how many customers listed on the distribution lists did not receive the recalled beef and the number of customers not listed on distribution lists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed USDA and FDA staff involved with the recall to understand the timing of recall actions and the challenges encountered during the recall.

To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground beef by a ConAgra plant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDA s recall file and other documents on the recall. We also met with the department s Office of Inspector General and reviewed the Inspector General s September 2003 report.1

We conducted our review from May 2003 through August 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great Plains Region Audit Report: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight of Production Process and Recall at ConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No. 24601-2-KC (September 2003).

Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Appendix II

On December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the state of Washington had tested positive for BSE commonly referred to as mad cow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA took to recall the meat and the actions FDA took with respect to FDA-regulated products, such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered parts of the animal.

Beef Recall Was Triggered by a BSEPositive Sample from One Cow On December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered 23 cows. USDA, in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the time, took a sample of 1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition of the tested cow is now disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its Ames, Iowa National Veterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner because the cow did not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA test results indicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December 23, 2003.

Recall Begun in December 2003 Was Completed in March 2004 On December 23, 2003, after learning about the positive BSE test, USDA headquarters notified the Boulder District Office, which is the field office with jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder District began gathering information about the recalling company s product distribution. Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were on-site at 7:00 p.m. The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the recalling company s production would have to be recalled, but further examination of facility cleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only necessary to recall 1 day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15 p.m. and discussed the science related to BSE and whether the recalling company s cleanup practices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day of production. Following USDA s determination to conduct a Class II recall that is, the beef posed a remote possibility of adverse health consequences USDA contacted the recalling company to discuss recall details and the press release. The press release and Recall Notification Report were released that evening.

On December 24, 2003, USDA s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) sent inspectors to the recalling company s primary customers to obtain secondary customer distribution lists and product shipping records. USDA conducted 100 percent verification checks for this recall it contacted every customer that received the recalled meat. This level of verification checks is well above the percentage of checks conducted by USDA district offices for the Class I recalls we reviewed.

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and tertiary customers of the recalling company.

Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again to verify product disposition.

On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDA s Recall Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall, and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA considered the recall to be complete.

Recall Was Complicated by Inaccurate Distribution Lists and Mixing of Potentially Contaminated and Noncontaminated Beef USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the recalling company s three primary customers was slow in providing its customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that primary customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which specific customers received the product.

Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments, such as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they supply. To deal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beef was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the stores that were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores were included in the recall that may never have received recalled beef. The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in the recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003, and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer on December 10, 2003. The recalling company s carcasses were tagged to identify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customer removed the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses with the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not be distinguished, the recall included all 43 carcasses at the primary customer.

After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from the carcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Both establishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses with meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cow resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef. Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined to complicate USDA s identification of where the product went. Specifically, on December 23, 2003, USDA s initial press release stated that the recalling company was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December 26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed within Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that one of the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef to facilities in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a total of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of the secondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributed the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total of eight states and one territory.

On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determined that the beef went to only six states Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana and that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, or Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shipping records, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piece together exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The lists Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

showed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of those may have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that 176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef, including the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDA s review also indicated that recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDA checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm that was the case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713 customers on the lists. USDA s initial checks identified an additional 45 customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not included on the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4 summarizes USDA s verification efforts during the recall.

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

Figure 4: USDA s Recall Verification Checks by Location and Customer Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with BSE

Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customers plus the recalling company, for a total of 582 verification checks.

USDA s press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beef products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us that downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, for a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at the secondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with the

D = Distributor R = Retailer SF = Storage facility P = Processor

Primary customers (15 total) Recalling slaughterhouse (WA) 1 R (OR) 1 P (WA) 1 P (OR) 1 P (OR) 11 R (WA) Secondary customers (40 total) Tertiary customers (526 total) 1 R (OR) 1 SF (OR) 3 D (OR) 3 D (WA) 2 dual D (OR) 59 R (OR) 79 R (WA) 5 R (ID) 3 R (UT) 4 R (MT) 161 R (WA) 8 R (ID) 15 R (OR) 2 R (AK) 31 R (OR) 8 R (WA) 10 R (NV) 5 R (ID) 10 R (CA) 2 R (CA) 17 R (OR) 5 R (WA) 1 D (NV) 11 R (CA) 85 R (NV) 3 D (OR) 11 R (OR) 2 D (CA) 26 R (CA) 2 R (WA)

( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations for each state. Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check documents.

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level is unknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalled meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than 64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers, and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much of the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000 pounds that were recovered.

FDA s Role in USDA s Recall

Parts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on December 9, 2003, were not used for food, but they were sent to renderers to be separated into raw materials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered materials are used for many purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA has jurisdiction over renderers.

When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December 23, 2003, the agency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003, FDA sent an inspection team to a renderer that handled materials from the BSE cow. Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered BSE positive cow were on the premises. FDA later identified a second company that potentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE cow. Both renderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product processed from the diseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by FDA and local authorities.

On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated, rendered material (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently loaded on a ship, and on January 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington, for Asia. The renderer initiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it could be disposed of as directed by FDA and local authorities. The ship carrying the material returned to the United States on February 24, 2004, and the material was disposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004.

On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to expand their voluntary holds to rendered materials processed from December 23, 2003, through January 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some recalled meat or trim that was recovered from retail establishments. Both renderers agreed to the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested that renderers voluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered material. FDA confirmed that none of the potentially contaminated, rendered material entered commerce, because FDA accounted for all rendered material. FDA

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

reported that no recall was necessary because no product was distributed commercially by the rendering companies.

USDA and FDA Worked Together on the Recall USDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both agencies notified each other if their investigations yielded any information about products within the jurisdiction of the other agency. For instance, when conducting the second round of verification checks, USDA tracked the disposition of the product to renderers and landfills and notified FDA when the product went to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification checks (approximately 5 percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both agencies indicated they regularly interacted and shared information. Table 3 outlines the agencies actions.

Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company Actions Related to the Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSE

Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions

12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is slaughtered.

12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSE testing. " Recalling company sends carcasses to primary customer for processing.

12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meat products to two other primary customers for further processing.

12/12 -

12/23/03 " Other primary customers distribute recalled product to secondary customers. " Secondary customers distribute recalled product to tertiary customers.

12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptively positive. " Recall meeting. " Initiation of voluntary recall. " Press release. " FDA notified of BSE test results. " FDA dispatches investigation teams.

12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1. " FDA determines some rendered material from Renderer 1 is intended for Indonesia. " FDA discovers some material may have been sent to Renderer 2. " Renderer 1 agrees to hold remaining rendered material. " Recalling company contacts primary customers. " Primary customers contact their customers.

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation from reference lab in England that cow in question is BSE positive.

12/26/03 " Verification checks begin " USDA announces recalled product in Washington State and Oregon. " FDA begins process of comparing records to ensure all products from Renderers 1 and 2 are accounted for. " Renderer 2 agrees to hold all material that may have been derived from BSE cow. None of the rendered material has been distributed.

12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product was distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, and Nevada. " FDA issues statement confirming that the rendering plants that processed all of the nonedible material from the BSE cow have placed a voluntary hold on all of the potentially infectious product, none of which had left the control of the companies and entered commercial distribution.

12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product was distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.

12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Service determines that the recalled meat products were distributed to 42 locations, with 80 percent of the products distributed to stores in Oregon and Washington State.

12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA to complete recall verification checks.

1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled product was only distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana, and Idaho.

1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer that some of the rendered material on hold from Renderer 1 was inadvertently shipped to Asia. Renderer 1 commits to isolate and return the rendered material. " Rendering company notifies FDA of shipment of product on hold.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

Source: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information.

1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 that they may have rendered meat or trim subject to recall from retail stores. " FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 to place all rendered material from December 23 to January 9 on hold. " FDA determines neither renderer had shipped rendered material manufactured after December 23, 2003.

2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed of in landfill, except material shipped to Asia.

2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered material returns to U.S. port.

2/25/04 " Verification checks complete. " USDA Boulder District Office concludes recall is effective.

3/1/04 " Recall is closed.

3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill of remaining rendered material...

snip...

REPORTS

1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October 7.tss

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51

Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0551high.pdf

Appendix C. Agents that require specific government approval for scientific investigations within the USA.a

Select agents, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services onlyb High consequence pathogens and agents, U.S. Department of Agriculture onlyc HIgh consequence livestock pathogens and toxins, overlap agents and toxinsd

(NO HUMAN TSE LISTED ???...tss) BSE agent

http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/publications/disease_emergence/AppendixC.pdf

QFC sued over mad cow case

Grocer negligently exposed them to beef, family claims

Friday, March 5, 2004

By LEWIS KAMB SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER

An Eastside family who says they ate beef linked to the nation's only known case of mad cow disease yesterday filed a class-action lawsuit against QFC, claiming the grocery store chain negligently exposed them and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them that they had bought it.

Attorneys for Jill Crowson, a 52-year-old interior designer from Clyde Hill, filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court on behalf of her family and possibly hundreds of other customers who unwittingly bought and consumed beef potentially exposed to mad cow disease.

"I was pretty upset about it," Crowson said. "I've spent all of my kids' lives trying to be a responsible parent for them to keep them safe. I felt badly that the food I served could be harmful to their health."

The lawsuit is believed to be the first stemming from this country's only confirmed case of mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, which was detected in a slaughtered Holstein from a Yakima Valley ranch on Dec. 23.

Neither officials at Quality Food Centers' Bellevue headquarters, or Kroger -- the company's Ohio-based corporate parent -- could be reached for comment about the lawsuit yesterday.

The suit contends the family bought and later ate ground beef from their local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern's Moses Lake Meats on Dec. 9 and included meat from the diseased Holstein.

The beef was later shipped to wholesalers and retailers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada.

On Dec. 23 -- after government scientists confirmed the Holstein was infected with BSE -- businesses began pulling potentially affected beef from store shelves under a voluntary recall.

But the family's suit claims that, although QFC was aware of the recall on Dec. 23, the store did not begin pulling the recalled beef from about 40 of its stores that carried it until Dec. 24.

The company also did not try to warn customers about the recalled beef until Dec. 27 -- and only then with small, inconspicuous signs inside the stores, the suit claims.

Steve Berman, the family's attorney, said the company had "a duty to warn" consumers who bought the beef under terms of the Washington Product Liability Act.

QFC could've easily notified customers by taking out TV, radio or newspaper ads, or by tracking and notifying those who bought the beef through customers' QFC Advantage Cards, Berman said.

At Berman's downtown Seattle firm yesterday, Crowson described how on Dec. 22 and Dec. 23 -- the day of the recall -- she bought single packages of "9 percent leanest ground beef" from her local QFC store at Bellevue Village.

Crowson took the beef home, cooked it and made tacos one night and spaghetti the next -- serving the dinners to herself; her daughter, Laura, 22; son, Nicholas, 19; and her niece, Claire De Winter, 23. Members of the family also ate leftovers from those meals for the next several days, Crowson said.

"When the news about mad cow came out, I instantly became concerned," Crowson said. "But the initial stories didn't mention anything about QFC, so I thought we were OK."

While shopping at the grocery store a few days later, Crowson said she asked a store butcher whether QFC stores had sold any of the recalled beef. The butcher assured her they had not, she said.

The family only learned QFC had sold any of the beef in question after reading a news story Jan. 10 about a Mercer Island man who discovered his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store, Crowson said.

Crowson later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking that it track purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card -- a store discount card issued to customers. On Jan. 12, the company notified Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact, part of the recalled batch, she said.

Scientists believe people who eat beef from infected cows can contract a fatal form of the disease.

The family is "now burdened with the possibility that they presently carry (the disease) that may have an incubation period of up to 30 years," the lawsuit says.

Lawyers for the family say they believe hundreds, if not thousands, of QFC customers, and those of other stores, likely ate beef from the recalled batch -- the reason why Berman filed their legal claim as a class-action lawsuit. A USDA official this week said that up to 17,000 pounds of meat affected by the recall likely was eaten or thrown out by customers.

Berman added that an investigator from his firm learned that QFC buys beef for its "9 percent leanest ground beef" products in large tubs that can weigh several hundred pounds, and then regrinds and packages the meat for sale.

Because QFC stores regrind the beef before selling it, Berman contends that makes the store a manufacturer responsible under the Washington Product Liability Act for not selling any unsafe product.

Scientists believe people who eat beef from cows infected with BSE can contract variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob, a fatal brain-wasting disease that has been detected in about 150 people worldwide.

However, officials with the U.S. Agriculture Department have repeatedly said the risk from eating muscle cuts from an infected cow -- the likely cut of meat processed and sold for hamburger in the recalled batch -- is extremely low.

Although Crowson said she tries not to "obsess over it," she is fearful that her family could one day become sick.

"It's pretty scary," she said.

Because no medical test is available to determine whether a living person is infected with the disease, the couple's "stress and fear cannot be allayed," the lawsuit said.

The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical monitoring costs.

Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit isn't about money. "The more I've thought about this, the angrier I've gotten," she said.

snip...

http://home.hetnet.nl/~mad.cow/archief/2004/mar04/sued.htm

QFC s Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit

Family claims QFC should have used customer database to warn those at risk sooner

March 05, 2004

SEATTLE A Bellevue, Wash. family today filed a proposed class-action lawsuit against Quality Food Centers (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger (NYSE: KR), claiming the grocery store chain should have used information gathered through its customer loyalty program to warn those who purchased beef potentially tainted with mad cow disease.

The suit, filed in King County Superior Court, seeks to represent all Washington residents who purchased the potentially tainted meat, and asks the court to establish a medical monitoring fund.

Jill Crowson purchased the potentially tainted beef from a Bellevue QFC on Dec. 22 and 23, and used her Advantage Card, QFC s customer loyalty program. She served the meat to her husband over Dec. 25 and 26, and later heard of the recall in the newspaper.

Steve Berman, the attorney representing the Crowsons, asserts that since the company tracks purchases, it should have warned the Crowsons and many other customers who purchased the beef at approximately 40 stores across Washington.

If you lose your keys with an Advantage Card attached, QFC will return them to you free of charge, said Berman. If they can contact you over a lost set of car keys, why couldn t they contact you and tell you that the beef you purchased could kill you?

QFC is among the large number of grocers that track customer purchases through loyalty cards like the Advantage Card. Once a customer shares contact information including name, address and phone number they are given discounts on certain items.

Regardless of any discounts offered, the loyalty card tracks customers every purchase and stores them in a central database, the complaint states.

We contend that QFC knew which Advantage Card customers purchased the suspect meat, and could have easily called to warn them, said Berman. Instead, QFC used a series of spurious excuses to hide their failure to act.

On Dec. 23, the U.S. Department of Agriculture ordered the recall of approximately 10,410 pounds of raw beef that may have been infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which if consumed by humans can lead to the always-fatal Cruetzfeldt-Jakobs Disease (vCJD).

According to the complaint, QFC at first mistakenly believed it did not have any of the affected beef and took no action to remove the product from its shelves. The store later removed the beef on Dec. 24, but then did little to warn those who earlier purchased the meat, the suit claims.

It wasn t until Dec. 27 that the grocery chain posted small signs with information about the recall, the complaint alleges.

The Crowsons contacted QFC when they suspected they had purchased the potentially tainted meat, but QFC would not confirm their suspicions for two more weeks, the suit states. According to Berman, the family had to file a written request before QFC would confirm their fears.

According to health experts, Cruetzfeldt-Jakobs Disease can have an incubation period of as long as 30 years. There is no test to determine if infection took place after possible exposure, nor is there any treatment once one is infected. The condition is always fatal.

If the court grants the suit class-action status, QFC would likely be compelled to turn over the names of those who purchased the potentially tainted beef.

The proposed class-action claims QFC violated provisions of the Washington Product Liability Act by failing to give adequate warning to consumers about the potentially dangerous meat.

The suit seeks unspecified damages for the plaintiffs, as well as the establishment of a medical monitoring fund.

http://www.hagens-berman.com/frontend?command=PressRelease&task=viewPressReleaseDetail&iPressReleaseId=654

QFC's Delayed Mad Cow Response Draws Lawsuit

... subsidiary of Kroger , claiming the grocery store chain should ... beef potentially tainted with "mad cow disease ... beef at approximately 40 stores across Washington. ...
www.forrelease.com/D20040305/sff005.P2.03042004214558.03634.html - 9k -

040307 Woman Sues QFC Over Mad-Cow Recall ... Jakob disease, the human form of mad-cow, from eating ... QFC is subject to the Washington Product Liability ... been found in a slaughtered Yakima County dairy cow. ... www.spcnetwork.com/mii/2004/040307.htm - 6k

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

JILL CROWSON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS

VS

QUALITY FOOD CENTERS, INC., an Ohio corporation Defendent

NO. 04-2-05608-0 SEA

snip...

The Court hereby GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims based on a manufacturer's strict liability (Counts I and II) and DENIES the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of negligence by a product seller (Count III).

DATED this 14th day of June, 2004

snip...

http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/Mad%20Cow%20Order%20Denying%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss1088546283878.pdf

Date Filed: March 5, 2004 Court: King County Superior Court (Washington) Location: Seattle Ticker Symbol: NYSE:KR

Join This Suit Tell a Friend

Consumers filed a proposed class-action lawsuit against Quality Food Centers (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger (NYSE: KR), claiming the grocery store chain should have used information gathered through its customer loyalty program to warn those who purchased beef potentially tainted with ?mad cow disease.? The USDA issued a recall notice for the meat on December 23, 2003. QFC sold the meat through its approximately 40 stores across Washington.

The suit claims that even though QFC had the ability to quickly warn every customer who purchased the potentially deadly meat if they used the QFC Advantage Card at the time of purchase, the grocery store neglected to do so.

The suit seeks to represent every consumer in Washington state who purchased the recalled meat from QFC.

Recent Updates

June 14, 2004 - the King County Superior Court gave the green light to a suit claiming QFC didn't do enough to warn customers about beef potentially tainted with 'mad cow disease,' finding enough questions about the beef and QFC's responsibility to explore in the courtroom.

Read the court order.

http://www.hagens-berman.com/frontend?command=Lawsuit&task=viewLawsuitDetail&iLawsuitId=653

QFC - 'Mad Cow' Frequently Asked Questions

The Suit

What is the key issue in this suit? On December 23, 2003, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) recalled more than 10,000 pounds of raw beef that could have been exposed to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Humans consuming BSE-tainted meat can contract Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), an always-fatal condition.

QFC sold this meat throughout its stores in Washington. Even though QFC had the ability to quickly warn every customer who purchased the potentially deadly meat if they used the QFC advantage card at the time of purchase, the grocery store neglected to do so, the suit alleges.

Who does the suit seek to represent? The suit seeks to represent all persons who purchased recalled meat from any QFC store in the state of Washington.

Who are the defendants? Quality Food Centers, or QFC. Once a local, Northwest company, QFC is now a wholly owned subsidiary of the grocery chain giant, Kroger.

What does the suit seek? The suit asks the court to order QFC to establish a medical monitoring fund which would allow those who purchased and consumed the meat to seek medical care, checking for ? and if necessary, treating --- the infection of vCJD. The suit also seeks the creation of a medical notification system, allowing those who may have been exposed to the disease to receive periodic updates on research and treatment of vCJD. The suit also seeks unspecified damages for the plaintiffs.

Does the suit claim QFC violated specific laws? Yes. The lawsuit claims QFC violated the Washington Product Liability Act. In addition, the suit claims QFC was negligent by not warning consumers of the dangers associated with the affected meat.

Where was the lawsuit filed? The suit was filed in King County Superior Court on March 4, 2004.

How do I determine if I qualify to join the lawsuit? If you have a QFC Advantage card and believe that you bought recalled meat from a QFC store, you may be eligible to join the lawsuit. Click here to fill out the sign-up request form, or you can contact Hagens Berman attorneys.

QFC

What is the QFC Advantage Card? The Advantage Card is known in the grocery industry as a Customer Loyalty Card. Customers who sign up for QFC?s Advantage Card receive special discounts on selected items, but gives the grocery store chain the ability to track consumers? purchases in order to enhance their marketing efforts. In addition, grocery chains which offer affinity card programs often use the database and shopping pattern data to send users coupons and other marketing material. According to the complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by consumers presenting the Advantage Card, including product description, date of purchase, store of purchase and the price, and saves that data with customer contact information.

What was QFC?s response to the meat recall? On Dec. 23, 2003, QFC received notice from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) of a recall of approximately 10,410 lbs. of raw meat that may have been contaminated with the infectious agent that causes ?mad cow? disease. QFC did not act immediately on the recall notice but initially responded by denying that it had any of the tainted meat. On December 24 QFC pulled the meat from its shelves, but the company took no steps to directly warn consumers. It was not until Dec. 27 that QFC posted small signs in its stores recalling the tainted beef, according to the complaint. During that four day period when QFC was silent hundreds of consumers may have eaten the meat.

Can QFC determine if an Advantage Card holder purchased the potentially dangerous meat? Yes. In fact, consumers can now contact QFC directly and the company will provide information about meat purchases ? but only if you ask. Hundreds of other consumers who purchased the meat and are unaware of the situation have not heard from QFC, the complaint states.

Why was QFC sued even though they pulled the meat? Under Washington law since QFC ground the meat it is deemed a manufacturer and is strictly liable for any unsafe product. In addition QFC possessed specific and easily obtainable information on which customers purchased the recalled meat, but did not act to inform customers, the suit states. Considering the potential danger and risk of worry for consumers, and the ease of contacting consumers using database information, simply pulling the meat from the shelves and belatedly posting small signs was not an adequate response, according to the complaint.

What information on customer purchases does QFC track with the Advantage Card? QFC tracks every purchase that a customer with an Advantage Card makes, regardless of whether discounts are offered or not, according to the complaint.

Does the recently announced larger-than-expected recall of beef affect the lawsuit? No. Regardless of the size of the beef recall, attorneys believe the facts in the case remain the same.

How can I find out if I bought recalled meat from QFC? If you believe that you may have purchased recalled meat from a QFC store, and you have an Advantage Card, you can contact QFC and ask if your record shows you purchased recalled beef. You can contact QFC at 866-221-4141.

Isn't QFC prohibited by privacy laws from contacting consumers with warnings like this? No ? the suit notes that the company will return car keys returned to the store if the keys have an Advantage Card attached. According the complaint, If QFC can return car keys by mail, why can?t they send a notice saying the meat a customer purchased in their store could cause an incurable, fatal disease? Further privacy laws would prevent QFC from disclosing information to third parties, disclosing the information to the customer whose card it is does not violate privacy laws. For example, if a trade group wanted to know the names of consumers who purchased a given drug sold at QFC, disclosure of that private information might be a privacy concern. However, disclosure to a consumer of his own records is not.

Mad Cow Disease

What is Mad Cow disease? In cows, mad cow disease is defined as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), and is a progressive neurological disease. The human disease variant is know as Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), which is a rare brain disorder that causes a rapid, progressive dementia and is always fatal, according to the complaint.

Where can I get more information on Mad Cow disease? The USDA provides information on the disease at www.usda.gov/.

What should I do if I believe that I?ve eaten recalled meat? According to the complaint, no screening tests or treatments have been found for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Those who suspect they?ve eaten recalled meat should contact their physician for more information.

http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/madcowfaq1-13-051105661006369.html

Do Stores That Offer Loyalty Cards Have a Duty to Notify Customers of Product Safety Recalls?

A Recent Suit Raises This Novel Question By ANITA RAMASASTRY ----

Thursday, Aug. 05, 2004

An interesting new Washington state court suit raises an important question: If a retailer benefits from collecting personally identifiable information about its customers, does it have a corresponding duty to use such data to alert its customers that products they've bought have been recalled for health or safety reasons? And if so, could turning over private data to companies actually create benefits, as well as privacy risks, for the consumer?

In the suit, consumer Jill Crowson is suing her grocery store -- Quality Food Center (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger -- for negligent infliction of emotional distress and disregard of a "duty to warn" under the Washington Product Liability Act. Crowson alleges in her complaint that QFC failed to alert her family that ground beef it had sold them had been recalled in December's mad-cow scare.

Yet, Crowson says, QFC easily could have done so through information it maintained connected with her Advantage card - a "loyalty card" that meant QFC had Crowson's name, address and purchasing information. According to her complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by consumers presenting the Advantage Card, including product description, date of purchase, store of purchase and the price, and saves that data alongside customer contact information.

Now, Crowson says, her family members "feel like walking time bombs" knowing they may be infected with the human form of mad-cow disease which the complaint states may have an up-to-30-year incubation period. And they are not the only ones: Crowson is seeking class action status for herself and what she believes are "hundreds" of similarly-situated Washington customers at QFC's approximately 40 stores in the state.

Some lawyers think Crowson's suit is a stretch. Federal law does not impose on companies a specific duty to notify consumers when tainted meat is recalled under the direction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), as was the case here. Also, Crowson and her family, and the class she seeks to represent, are suing based on fear (and possible future harm), not current illness. Moreover, the chance they will actually get Mad Cow Disease some time in the future are apparently remote.

Nevertheless, the lawsuit has strong intuitive appeal: QFC could have saved the Crowsons and others like them a lot of worry, and perhaps sleepless nights, with what appears would have been minimal effort, using information at its digital fingertips. And the court has already once refused to dismiss it - finding that there were sufficient factual questions about the beef and about QFC's responsibility to the Crowsons, to merit further exploration of the evidence, through discovery and in the courtroom.

Regardless of the outcome of Crowson's suit, it underscores the need for retailers and policymakers to examine what sort of responsibilities come with private data gathering under loyalty card schemes.

The Lawsuit: The Chronology of Facts Alleged, and the Loyalty Card at Issue

On December 22 and 23, 2003, Crowson bought ground beef from a QFC store. Also on December 23, 2003, the USDA recalled Washington beef after it confirmed that a cow slaughtered in Washington had been infected with Mad Cow Disease. But Crowson says QFC did not pull the affected meat from its shelves until December 24, and did not post signs in its stores announcing the recall until December 27. By then, the Crowson family had eaten the meat.

Crowson states that she only learned of the recall by reading an article in her local newspaper. She said she subsequently called the supermarket chain, then faxed QFC a letter asking that her purchase be traced through her QFC Advantage card. On January 10, she was notified that her ground beef purchase was indeed from the recalled batch.

Crowson says that what QFC allegedly did in response to the recall - pulling the beef from shelves the next day, and posting signs three days after that -- was far from enough. She says it should have immediately warned customers who had bought possibly tainted meat through newspaper, radio and television advertising -- and by contacting individually those who, like her, had Advantage cards. Its failure to do so, she says, is what makes the company liable to her and other shoppers.

The Advantage Card is known in the retail industry as a customer "loyalty card" - providing discounts on specific items, in exchange for consumer information that will aid in better tailoring the company's marketing efforts. Combining the data from one's loyalty card application with data from other commercial databases or public records (for examples, mortgage records, or court filings) can often allow a very specific profile of each consumer.

Some states limit the types of information that a grocery store can collect from you when you register for a loyalty card. For example, California state law prohibits a grocery store from requiring that you turn over your social security or your driver's license number.

Companies, of course, stress the potential savings that might result from use of a loyalty card. Consider, for instance, the sales pitch on the QFC website it reads: "If you don't have a QFC Advantage Card, you're missing out! The Advantage Card is a powerful new way to save on the groceries you buy every day. It gives you the best of all possible worlds: premium quality, superb service and lower prices. That's something no other grocery store can match. So make sure you take advantage of the big savings."

Privacy advocates complain that loyalty cards result in the improper use - and, often, sale to third parties - of customers' private information. QFC apparently doesn't sell customers' data to third parties, however. Its website promises that "QFC will not release your name to any list service or manufacturer, and that such information will be held in the strictest of confidence-even within our company."

Privacy advocates also warn, however, that even if third-party sales of data are not allowed, the data compiled can always be accessed with a subpoena or warrant and used against the customer in court proceedings. Meanwhile, consumer advocates claim that certain loyalty cards don't really offer the savings they promise. Nevertheless, numerous stores employ loyalty cards.

Turning the Privacy Debate on Its Head: With Great Information, Comes Great Responsibility?

The Crowson lawsuit turns the privacy debate on its head. Typically, privacy advocates ask retailers to safeguard the personal information they collect about their shoppers. In this case, in contrast, plaintiff is asking that QFC delve into its database to notify her about a meat recall.

QFC does this very thing if a consumer loses his or her keys with an Advantage Card attached to them - returning the keys free of charge. So Crowson's attorney, Steve Berman, asks: "If they can contact you over a lost set of car keys, why couldn't they contact you and tell you that the beef you purchased could kill you?"

According to some news reports, QFC was reluctant to call customers regarding the recall based on privacy concerns. But in this case, the concerns seem misplaced. No privacy law is violated when a consumer communicates with the customer herself regarding private information - indeed, every offer the customer receives is, in a sense, this kind of communication. When the customer is receiving personalized discounts based on her purchase history, why can't she receive personalized health and safety warnings based on that history, too?

Was There a Duty to Warn Here?

From the law's perspective, the question will be not whether QFC ideally should have warned the Crowsons - of course it should have. The question will be if it had a legal duty to do so. Such a duty would come from either the common law of torts, which allows claims where there is a duty to behave reasonably to prevent foreseeable harm to others. . Or it might come from the Washington product liability statute - which, as noted above, creates a "duty to warn" in certain situations.

And of course, if there is no current duty, the legislature may see fit to pass a statute creating such a duty. :It may seem more prudent, however, for retailers to voluntarily assume such a responsibility. When companies benefit from collecting customer information, shouldn't they also assume a duty to protect customers from known risks associated with that very information? Some risks, of course, may be a matter of opinion. But this one was not: The fact of the risk was acknowledged by the USDA recall of the meat. With this kind of clear notice of the risk, it seems that QFC either does - or ought to - have a duty to protect customers from this risk.

Of course, should a retailer not wish to take on this responsibility, it can also change its loyalty program. QFC and other retailers could still track consumer purchases without asking them for personally identifiable information.

http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040805.html

FindLaw's Writ - Ramasastry: Mad Cow in the USA

http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20031230.html

Family to sue grocery chain

A Seattle family that ate beef linked to the US's only known case of BSE has filed a classaction

lawsuit against the grocery chain QFC, claiming the company negligently exposed

them and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them that they had

bought it.34 The suit contends that Jill Crowson and her family bought and later ate ground

beef from their local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern's Moses Lake Meats on

9 December 2003 and included meat from the diseased Holstein. The beef was later shipped

to wholesalers and retailers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada.

After government scientists confirmed on 23 December that the Holstein was infected with

BSE, businesses began pulling potentially affected beef from store shelves under a voluntary

recall. But, the family's suit claims, although QFC was aware of the recall, the store did not

begin pulling the beef from about 40 of its stores until 24 December. The company also did

not try to warn customers about the recalled beef until 27 December – and only then with

small, inconspicuous signs inside the stores, the suit claims. The family only learned QFC had

9

sold any of the beef in question after reading a news story on 10 January about a man who

discovered his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store, Crowson

said. She later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking that it track

purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card, and on 12 January the company notified

Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact, part of the recalled

batch, she said.

The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical monitoring costs.

Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit is not about money. "The more I've thought

about this, the angrier I've gotten," she said. Neither the company nor its parent corporation,

Kroger, have commented.

http://www.which.net/campaigns/food/safety/bse_reports/bserep0304.pdf

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Pennsylvania Firm Recalls Ground Beef Patties Due To Mislabeling
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2004 16:01:19 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

Pennsylvania Firm Recalls Ground Beef Patties Due To Mislabeling

Recall Release CLASS III RECALL FSIS-RC-028-2004 HEALTH RISK: NONE

Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113; FAX: (202) 690-0460 Steven Cohen

WASHINGTON, DC - July 28, 2004 - Quaker Maid Meats, Inc., a Reading, Penn., firm, is voluntarily recalling approximately 170,000 pounds of ground beef patties due to mislabeling. The beef patties were partially made from Canadian product that was mislabeled and ineligible for import to the U.S.

Products subject to recall include:

* 5-pound boxes of "PHILLY-GOURMET, 100% PURE BEEF, HOMESTYLE PATTIES" with a packaging code of 1974 or 2024. * 3-pound boxes of "PHILLY-GOURMET, 100% PURE BEEF, HOMESTYLE PATTIES" with a packaging code of 1974 or 2024. * 3-pound boxes of "The Philly Homestyle Beef Patty" with a packaging code of 1984 or 2014.

The products also bear the "Est. 2748" inside the USDA mark of inspection. The patties were produced on July 15, 16, 19 and 20 and were shipped to distribution centers and retail stores in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Wisconsin and Maine.

Consumers and media with questions about the recall may contact company General Manager Todd Bray at 610-376-1500, ext. 114.

Consumers with food safety questions can phone the toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline at 1-888-MPHotline (l-888-674-6854). The hotline is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. Product label photos: Label of 5-pound boxes of PHILLY-GOURMET, 100% PURE BEEF, HOMESTYLE PATTIES Label of 3-pound boxes of The Philly Homestyle Beef Patty Label of 3-pound boxes of PHILLY-GOURMET, 100% PURE BEEF, HOMESTYLE PATTIES #

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_028_2004_Release/index.asp

Recall Release CLASS III RECALL

FSIS-RC-028-2004 HEALTH RISK: NONE

IF there is NO risk, why the recall? why the ban?

Of all the species exposed naturally to the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agent, the greater kudu (Tragelaphus strepsiceros), a nondomesticated bovine from Africa, appears to be the most susceptible to the disease. We present the results of mouse bioassay studies to show that, contrary to findings in cattle with BSE in which the tissue distribution of infectivity is the most limited recorded for any of the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE), infectivity in greater kudu with BSE is distributed in as wide a range of tissues as occurs in any TSE. BSE agent was also detected in skin, conjunctiva, and salivary gland, tissues in which infectivity has not previously been reported in any naturally occurring TSE. The distribution of infectivity in greater kudu with BSE suggests possible routes for transmission of the disease and highlights the need for further research into the distribution of TSE infectious agents in other host species.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no6/pdfs/03-0615.pdf

USA BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE BSE GBR RISK FACTOR IV just because of the lies

Monday, November 30, 2009

USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html

Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html

Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

IMPORTATION OF CANADIAN CATTLE, BISON, SHEEP, AND GOATS INTO THE UNITED STATES 12/1/09

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/12/importation-of-canadian-cattle-bison.html

Monday, November 30, 2009

Taiwan, USDA, and USA beef, what the consumer does not know, could kill them

http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/11/taiwan-usda-and-usa-beef-what-consumer.html

Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM

Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html

Saturday, December 01, 2007

Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model Volume 13, Number 12–December 2007 Research

http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/2007/12/phenotypic-similarity-of-transmissible.html

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

Intraspecies transmission of L-type-like bovine spongiform encephalopathy detected in Japan

NOTE

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/12/intraspecies-transmission-of-l-type.html

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment

snip...

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006

>>>After seeing the USA Today report Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack has pledged to launch an independent review of testing standards for ground beef in school lunches.<<<>>>In the papers, the government alleges the meatpacking plant slaughtered and processed downer cows for nearly four years — from January 2004 to September 2007 — at the average rate of one every six weeks...<<< http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/09/suit-meatpacker-used-downer-cows-for-4.html

do you actually believe all these schools recalled this meat because of a few cattle being abused, see which schools recalled products due to suspect beef, in any given state, see if your kids were exposed to these dead stock downer cows, and whatever disease they may have had, and remember, cooking does NOT kill the PrP agent.

see list ; FNS All Regions Affected School Food Authorities By State United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service National School Lunch Program March 24, 2008 School Food Authorities Affected by Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Co. Beef Recall February 2006 - February 2008

http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/safety/Hallmark-Westland_byState.pdf

IF the url fails, go to this site ;

http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/

left hand corner search ; Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Co. Beef Recall your should get this ;

http://65.216.150.153/texis/search?pr=FNS

1 through 1 of 1 matching documents, best matches first. sort by date 1: Hallmark - Westland SFA Reporting by State - 3-24-2008.xls Lunch Program March 24, 2008 School Food Authorities Affected by Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Co. Beef Recall February 2006 - February 2008 The U.S. Department of Agriculture ...

http://www.fns.usda.gov/...ety/Hallmark-Westland_byState.pdf

I have tried to get these papers through the court, but no luck. they want me to pay to retrieve the papers, and i am not going to pay for something I know happened. about like the last two FOIA on suspect mad cow feed going into commerce in the USA in 2009. I knew it had, but wanted them to say it. and they finally did via the FOIA. Members of The HSUS are also concerned about the meat products provided to their children through the National School Lunch Program. More than 31 million school children receive lunches through the program each school day. To assist states in providing healthful, low-cost or free meals, USDA provides states with various commodities including ground beef. As evidenced by the HallmarkNVestland investigation and recall, the potential for downed animals to make their way into the National School Lunch Program is neither speculative nor hypothetical.

http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/FDA/hsus-v-schafer-usda-complaint.pdf

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. snip... The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf

Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html

Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM

Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

(CONFIRMED BSE RELATED...TSS)

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, the USDA fed our children all across the Nation dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens. who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???

SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/who-will-watch-children.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/

DO YOU WANT YOUR FOOD TO BE TRACEABLE ??? I do. ...TSS

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture April 2009 (Slightly Revised)

http://animalid.aphis.usda.gov/nais/naislibrary/documents/plans_reports/NAIS_overview_report.pdf

http://www.ers.usda.gov/features/cool/

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=usda_cool.xml

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518