COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING Fears of US imports infected with mad cow
disease is emerging as an issue in trans-Pacific trade talks
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING
the only reason North America, i.e. Canada, USA, and Mexico, does not want
COOL, is that it will bring the consumer one step closer to full trace-back of
any deadly pathogen the meat from the livestock might contain. one need not look
any further that mad cow tse prion disease. if you can not trace-back deadly
killer disease like the TSE prion disease on your meat, from store to store,
state to state, country to country, problem solved $$$ face it folks, when the
BSE GBR risk assessments were set aside and the BSE MRR policy was brought
forth, all bets were off, the legal trading of the Transmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease as a trading commodity was
born. they have not a clue about mad cow disease in Mexico, and not much better
in the USA and Canada, from the dismal testing figures and testing
protocols that have been so flawed in the past, it was a miracle that a case of
BSE was ever found, especially where you are testing perfectly healthy cattle,
and know they are healthy, in a BSE testing program. that’s a sure fire way of
finding negatives, testing healthy cows. due to a long incubating disease, that
is 100% fatal once clinical, any and all trace-back of any TSE prion tainted
meat and or meat products, and or by-products, will be futile. bottom line, with
H.R. 2393, the consumer has now become expendable. ...this screams big
ag///
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Ted Monoson May 19, 2015 (202) 225-2171
A targeted response to avoid retaliation Bipartisan press conference in
opposition of COOL
Today, House Agriculture Chairman K. Michael Conaway (R-TX) introduced H.R.
2393, a bill to repeal mandatory Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) requirements
for beef, pork, and chicken products. Chairman Conaway and his colleagues held a
bipartisan press conference with representatives from industries that are
targets of retaliation by Canada and Mexico.
H.R. 2393 would amend the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 to repeal
Country of Origin Labeling requirements with respect to beef, pork, and poultry,
and for other purposes. The Agriculture Committee will consider this legislation
tomorrow, May 20, during a 10:00 a.m. business meeting.
“In light of the WTO’s decision and the certainty that we face significant
retaliation by Canada and Mexico, we cannot afford to delay action. That’s why I
was joined by 61 of my colleagues in introducing H.R. 2393, a bill to repeal
mandatory COOL for beef, pork and chicken. This bill is a targeted response that
will remove uncertainty, provide stability, and bring us back into compliance. I
appreciate the support of so many colleagues on both sides of the aisle as we
work quickly to ensure our economy and a broad spectrum of U.S. industries do
not suffer the economic impacts of retaliation,” said Chairman Conaway.
“As we have seen time and again, mandatory Country of Origin Labeling is a
misguided government policy that has damaged our trading relationships with
Canada and Mexico and subjected the United States to trade retaliations. That is
why I am honored to be joined by my colleagues in introducing critical
bipartisan legislation to repeal COOL for beef, pork and chicken. We have the
data, studies, and the World Trade Organization’s experience to demonstrate that
COOL is detrimental to our state and national economies, and hurts our nation’s
beef, pork and chicken producers and packers. As such, I look forward to
continuing to work, in a bipartisan manner, with Congress to move this
legislation forward and repeal COOL,” said Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA), Ranking Member
of the House Agriculture Committee’s Livestock and Foreign Agriculture
Subcommittee.
“I am proud to be a co-sponsor of this bill. Repealing COOL is the right
thing to do. If Congress doesn’t act quickly, the retaliatory actions taken by
Canada and Mexico will bring widespread harm to countless families and
businesses across North Carolina and the country,” said Rep. David Rouzer
(R-NC), Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee’s Livestock and Foreign
Agriculture Subcommittee.
###
Mad cow disease risks trade pact
Mad cow disease risks trade pact
DENNIS SHANAHAN, POLITICAL EDITOR
Fears of US imports infected with mad cow disease is emerging as an issue
in trans-Pacific trade talks.
>>> Fears of US imports infected with mad cow disease is emerging
as an issue in trans-Pacific trade talks.
I don’t have access to your paper article, but you said a mouth full of
prions with that for sure. need not fear though, the OIE will save the day $$$
the OIE testing criteria is not set up to find BSE or any TSE prion in my
opinion, it's really set up to NOT find BSE, do to the simple fact of the
numbers they are testing, or the lack there of. they simply are not testing
enough. once the atypical BSE cases started showing up, usda shut the testing
back down to numbers they can't find BSE with, unless it's by an accident. and
really, who cares about a disease that is 100% fatal once clinical, a disease
that incubates for so long, you can never hardly trace back anything from it,
whether it be animal, people or product. case in point, 10,000,000 pounds of
banned blood laced ruminant protein that was fed out into commerce in 2007, some
10 years post mad cow feed ban. how's that working out for us$
if you look at cwd in the cervid, it's spreading at a pretty good pace in
North America, and does not look like it can be stopped yet. as far as the
bovine and bse, impossible to know since the OIE and the USDA made the TSE Prion
a legal global trading commodity by the BSE MRR policy, when they did away with
the BSE GBR policy. the testing there is at such a small number, they have to
just about find bse aka mad cow disease by accident, and that's if the testing
is done properly. how many times has the usda et al botched BSE testing, let me
count the ways. you could argue the same thing with scrapie. there trying to pen
the atypical BSE strains on a spontaneous event, when there is no such science
to prove it, all the while ignoring what's taking place in France with atypical
BSE. please understand, one of the greatest threats that has not come to pass
yet, by documentation, if ever documented, would be a worst case nightmare. _if_
or _when_, a strain of the tse prion transmits to the bovine (or human), that
can transmit vertical and horizontal in such a way as scrapie and cwd does in
cervid and caprine, then we are in a world of hurt. to date, as far as I know,
the only bovine tse prion tested for such a thing has been the typical mad cow
strain i.e. the c-BSE, i.e. the (typical c-BSE UK strain, as they term it), I
think they believe a small amount is maternal, and now we have another study
here about the placenta in scrapie.
Friday, April 24, 2015
The placenta shed from goats with classical scrapie is infectious to goat
kids and lambs
Oral.08:
Mother to offspring transmission of chronic wasting disease in Reeve's
Muntjac deer
Amy Nalls,1 Erin McNulty,1 Jenny Powers,2 Davis Seelig,1 Clare Hoover,1
Nicholas Haley,1 Jeanette Hayes-Klug,1 Kelly Anderson,1 Paula Stewart,3 Wilfred
Goldmann,3 Edward A. Hoover1 and Candace K. Mathiason1 1Colorado State
University; Fort Collins, CO USA; 2National Park Service; Fort Collins, CO USA;
3The Roslin Institute and Royal School of Veterinary Studies; Edinburgh,
UK
To investigate the role mother to offspring transmission plays in chronic
wasting disease (CWD), we have developed a cervid model employing the Reeve's
muntjac deer (Muntiacus reevesi). Eight muntjac doe were orally inoculated with
CWD and tested PrPCWD lymphoid positive by 4 mo post infection. Fourteen fawns
were born to these eight CWD-infected doe-3 were born viable, 6 were born
non-viable and 5 were harvested as fetuses from early or end-stage CWD-infected
doe. All three viable fawns have demonstrated CWD IHC lymphoid biopsy positivity
between 43 d post birth and 11 mo post birth. Two of these three CWD positive
viable offspring have developed clinical signs consistent with TSE disease
(28-33 mo post birth). Moreover, CWD prions have been detected by sPMCA in 11 of
16 tissues harvested from 6 full-term non-viable fawns and in 7 of 11 fetal
tissues harvested in utero from the second and third trimester fetuses.
Additional tissues and pregnancy related fluids from doe and offspring are being
analyzed for CWD prions. In summary, using the muntjac deer model we have
demonstrated CWD clinical disease in offspring born to CWD-infected doe, and in
utero transmission of CWD from mother to offspring. These studies provide basis
to further investigate the mechanisms of maternal transfer of prions.
www.landesbioscience.com
but they have not a clue yet about the atypical BSE strains, and this is
very worrisome, especially with the atypical L-type BASE BSE, the last
documented mad cow in the USA, was a atypical L-type BASE BSE in California.
2014
SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE1
ABSTRACT
Information on the pathogenesis and tissue distribution of Atypical Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle through the study of field cases and
experimental transmission studies is lacking. The latter are limited to
transmission of Atypical BSE through intracerebral (i.c.) inoculation of cattle.
All data currently available relate to the presence or absence of PrPSc, but do
not quantify relative amounts of PrPSc or levels of infectivity. A laboratory
protocol for further studies is recommended, to allow the assessment of the
relative infectious titre, PrPSc accumulation and prion seeding activity in the
tissues of cattle that developed H-BSE or L-BSE (using posterior brainstem as a
reference). Tissues to be covered by those studies are categorised in three
priorities, based on their inclusion in the list of specific risk material in
cattle, on the presence of infectivity, or PrPSc presence, demonstrated in
Atypical BSEs or other Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) in
ruminants, and on the importance in terms of input into the food chain in the
EU. The protocol provides details in terms of the minimum number of animals to
be tested, processing and preparation of tissues, and methods to be used to
identify abnormal PrP and quantify infectivity, also depending on the expected
level of infectivity and amount of tissue available for analysis. It is
recommended that, through the implementation of the protocol, information should
also be obtained on the performance of currently validated rapid tests for TSE
active surveillance in cattle/bioassay for detecting H-BSE and L-BSE
agents.
© European Food Safety Authority, 2014
KEY WORDS
Atypical BSE, cattle, H-BSE, L-BSE, laboratory protocol, prion
To date, 27 cases of L-BSE and 24 cases of H-BSE have been reported
worldwide (16), thus meaning that the prevalence of atypical BSE is considerably
lower than that of C-BSE. However, recent studies showed that L-BSE is easily
transmissible to transgenic mice expressing human (17,18) or bovine (19,20)
prion protein, as well as to non-human primates (21), with shorter incubation
periods than for the transmission of C-BSE to these animals. The virulent nature
of L-BSE has stimulated new concern for human public health since the
transmission of C-BSE to humans resulted in variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD) (4-7), a new emergent prion disease.
All the cases of BSE identified during the major outbreak in the UK were of
the same strain type [19]. However, an atypical form of BSE, Bovine Amyloidotic
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE), was discovered in Italy in 2004 in two old (11
and 15 year old) asymptomatic cows post mortem [19]. Other atypical forms of BSE
were subsequently reported in France, Germany and Japan [19-22]. The frequency
of atypical BSE may be similar to the occurrence of sporadic CJD, which is about
1 per million individuals [23]. BASE can be biochemically differentiated from
BSE by the different mobility of PrP fragments on gel electrophoresis. BASE can
also be distinguished from BSE histo-pathologically based on differences in the
distribution of vacuoles in the brain. ***BASE shares molecular and
histopathological features with the MV2 sub-type of human sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (sCJD).
spontaneous atypical BSE ???
if that's the case, then France is having one hell of an epidemic of
atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved
$$$
As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been
reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.
FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many
spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$
so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases
in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+
cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with
any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy:
Molecular similarities with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease
snip...please remember, the last home grown case of mad cow disease in the
USA, that was documented (this is key, that was _documented_), was in
California, and it was a case of the atypical L-type BASE BSE. please see
;
Saturday, May 09, 2015
*** Expression of genes involved in the T cell signalling pathway in
circulating immune cells of cattle 24 months following oral challenge with
Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) ***
Thursday, April 30, 2015
*** Immediate and ongoing detection of prions in the blood of hamsters and
deer following oral, nasal, or blood inoculations
Friday, January 30, 2015
*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Abstract
Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie
prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human
prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the
capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human
prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to
confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to
that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the
possible link between animal and human prions.
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
Thursday, March 26, 2015
National Scrapie Eradication Program Monthly Report - February 2015
what about manipulating tse prion testing to suit your needs $$$
Thursday, November 18, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92
BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS
Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent
application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglas
represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA
provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various
injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation
revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a
computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the
service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was
placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in
restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports
to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska
cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska
ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle
including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow
Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections
of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about
feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for
laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to
the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation
by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE
inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his
reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he
submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year
term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in
restitution.
and what about these famous tse prion tests, just what did happen here, ask
the redacted part that was uncovered in the second part...an epic ten year
battle to find the truth...the damn sheep never did have a tse prion...and they
knew it...tss
Friday, February 20, 2015
APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays
2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease
Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015
Saturday, January 31, 2015
RAPID ADVICE 17-2014 : Evaluation of the risk for public health of casings
in countries with a “negligible risk status for BSE” and on the risk of
modification of the list of specified risk materials (SRM) with regard to
BSE
Sunday, April 12, 2015
*** Research Project: Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 2014 Annual Report ***
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/04/research-project-transmission.html
Sunday, April 5, 2015
*** Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and
FedOn-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 ***
and the true numbers of victims from the mad cow crisis, is not being
documented, due to the industry fed nvCJD only theory, a theory that has nowbeen
proven wrong. sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE,atypical Scrapie,
and typical scrapie, with cwd waiting for science...
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European ***
http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2014/11/confirmed-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.htmlyep,
as predicted...tss
Saturday, May 09, 2015
*** Psychiatric Symptoms in Patients With Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
May 2010 at 21:21 GMT
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests
PotentialTransmissibility in Alzheimer Disease
Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3,
2014
Singeltary comment ;
Saturday, January 24, 2015
*** Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Atypical Pros and Cons
Monday, December 1, 2014
Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease
A Review
December 1, 2014
Thursday, January 29, 2015
Identification of H-type BSE in Portugal
Thursday, January 29, 2015
OIE REPORT Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Prion (atypical BSE type
H),Norway Information received on 29/01/2015
Thursday, July 24, 2014
Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution
ofinfectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05
Study of Atypical Bse
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
KURU Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopthy TSE Prion Disease
Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr.
This is a Comment on the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency
Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal
Products
For related information, Open Docket Folder Comment
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary
Submission ;
I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here? North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC. typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$ the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper. for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before. lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America. Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying. Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom) Country/Year snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS
No documents
available.
|
Sunday,
January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of
Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
Comment from Terry Singeltary
This is a Comment on the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) Notice: Draft Guidance for Industry on
Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm;
Availability
For related information, Open Docket Folder CommentGuidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 Singeltary Comment Greetings FDA et al, I wish to comment on Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180. Once again, I wish to kindly bring up the failed attempt of the FDA and the ruminant to ruminant mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997. This feed ban is still failing today, as we speak. Even more worrisome, is the fact it is still legal to feed cervids to cervids in the USA, in fact, the FDA only _recommends_ that deer and elk considered to be of _high_ risk for CWD do not enter the animal food chain, but there is NO law, its only voluntary, a recipe for a TSE prion disaster, as we have seen with the ruminant to ruminant feed ban for cattle, where in 2007, one decade post August 1997 mad cow feed ban, where in 2007 10,000,000 POUNDS OF BANNED BLOOD LACED MEAT AND BONE MEAL WHEN OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. Since 2007, these BSE feed ban rules have been breached time and time again. tons and tons of mad cow feed went out in Alabama as well, where one of the mad cows were documented, just the year before in 2006, and in 2013 and 2014, breaches so bad (OAI) Official Action Indicated were issued. those are like the one issued where 10 million pounds of banned blood laced meat and bone meal were fed out. What is the use of having a Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180, if it cannot be enforced, as we have seen with a mandatory ruminant to ruminant feed ban? I strenuously once again urge the FDA and its industry constituents, to make it MANDATORY that all ruminant feed be banned to all ruminants, and this should include all cervids as soon as possible for the following reasons... ====== In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administrations BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. ***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law. ====== 31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT *** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? *** 31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=85351 19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT *** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ; http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action;jsessionid=635CE9094E0EA15D5362B7D7B809448C?root=7143 Tuesday, December 23, 2014 FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2014/12/fda-part-589-substances-prohibited-from.html 2013 Sunday, December 15, 2013 FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2013/12/fda-part-589-substances-prohibited-from.html DOCKET-- 03D-0186 -- FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer and Elk in Animal Feed; Availability Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:47:37 0500 EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol #: 1 http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jun03/060903/060903.htm PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT SUBMISSION ; http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-03d-0186-fda-issues-draft.html 10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007 Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007 http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm Terry S. Singeltary Sr. *** See attached file(s)
No documents
available.
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Sunday, April 5, 2015
*** Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed
On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 ***
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk
(GBR) of the United States of America (USA) Publication date: 20 August 2004
Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)
Report
Summary Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date
scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the
likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE,
pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses
the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached
domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid
eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an
internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and
bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal
challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports
from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly)
into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and
grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported
MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk
increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk
countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely
but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in
rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the
probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the
BSE-agent persistently increases.
MEXICO BSE GBR
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment
of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of MEXICO
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group
on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date
scientific report on the GBR in Mexico, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of
one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as
clinically, in Mexico. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Mexico as
assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into Mexico and could have reached
domestic cattle. These cattle imported could have been rendered and therefore
led to an internal challenge in the mid to late 1990’s. It is possible that
imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Mexico reached domestic cattle and leads
to an internal challenge around 1993.
It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of
imported ‘at - risk’ MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live
‘at - risk’ cattle (mid to late 1990s). The high level of external challenge is
maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made
stable. Thus it is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from
approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained
internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system.
EFSA concludes that the current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III,
i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically) infected with the BSEagent. The GBR is likely to increase due to
continued internal and external challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, Mexico, third countries
SNIP...
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 4, 1-13 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Mexico
- 7 -
2.3 Overall assessment of the external challenge
The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle
system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final
opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002).
Live cattle imports:
According to the CD the country imported in total over the period 1980 to
2003, approximately 3.2 million live cattle from BSE - risk countries, of which
conclusively none came from the UK. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw
import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of
the external challenge. Broken down to 5 - years periods the resulting external
challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the
evidence that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle
system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of Mexico, it is assumed
that “cattle still alive” (imports from Spain) did not enter the rendering
system.
MBM imports:
According to the CD the country imported in total over the period 1980 -
2003 approximately 826,000 tons MBM from BSE - risk countries (according to
“other data”: ~ 919,000 tons), of which none came from the UK. The numbers shown
in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted
imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 - years
periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment
takes into account the evidence that certain imported MBM did not enter the
domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge for other
reasons. However, in the case of Mexico, there was not sufficient evidence to
remove any quantities of MBM from the external challenge.
SNIP...
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 4, 1-13 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of Mexico
- 12 -
would harbour, while being pre - clinical, as much infectivity as a
clinical BSE case. Hence cattle imports could have led to an internal challenge
about 3 years after the import of breeding cattle (that are normally imported at
20 - 24 months of age) that could have been infected prior to import. In case of
Mexico this implies that an internal challenge caused by live cattle imports
(predominantly from USA or Canada) first occurred in the mid to late 1990’s and
continued to the present.
On the other hand imports of contaminated MBM would lead to an internal
challenge in the year of import, if fed to cattle. The feeding system is of
utmost importance in this context. If it could be excluded that imported,
potentially contaminated feed stuffs reached cattle, such imports might not lead
to an internal challenge at all. In case of Mexico this implies that an internal
challenge caused by MBM imports (predominantly from USA or Canada) first
occurred around 1993 and continued to the present.
In view of the above - described consideration the combination of the very
/ extremely high external challenges with a very unstable system makes the
occurrence of an internal challenge likely in Mexico from approximately 1993
onwards.
4.2 Risk that BSE infectivity entered processing
It is likely that BSE infectivity entered processing at the time of
imported ‘at - risk’ MBM (1993) and at the time of slaughter of imported live
‘at - risk’ cattle (mid to late 1990’s). The high level of external challenge is
maintained throughout the reference period, and the system has not been made
stable, leading to increased internal challenge.
4.3 Risk that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated
It is likely that BSE infectivity was recycled and propagated from
approximately 1993. The risk has since grown consistently due to a maintained
internal and external challenge and lack of a stable system.
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE – RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely
but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent.
5.2 The expected development of the GBR as a function of the past and
present stability and challenge
• The GBR is likely to increase due to continued internal and external
challenge, coupled with a very unstable system.
SNIP...
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June
2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and
Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the
historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely
that BSE is present also in Mexico.
Subject: Mexico SAGARPA Assessment of BSE VS EFSA Scientific Report on the
Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of Mexico
Date: February 5, 2007 at 1:11 pm PST
Empresa solicitante: SAGARPA
Tipo del anƔlisis efectuado: Cuantitativo
TemĆ”tica: “AnĆ”lisis de riesgo sobre la ocurrencia de la encefalopatĆa
espongiforme bovina en MĆ©xico”
INTRODUCTION:
The bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), it is a neurological disease,
invariably fatal and with long period of incubation, that affects cattle. Its
etiologic agent is the prion. General consensus exists with respect to that the
feeding of contaminated meat and bone flours, it is the most significant source
in the dissemination and transmission of this etiologic agent. At this time
there is no exist evidence that BSE is transmitted by means of embryos, their
semen and in case of existing maternal transmission, if this could happened it
would be in a so extremely low rate that it could not be considered like a
trigger or leading factor of an epidemic. Controversy in respect to other
probable ways of transmission remains. The BSE was diagnosed for the first time
in 1986 in the United Kingdom. At this time it exists in 26 countries, including
a Canada and the United States of North America (USA).
This document summarizes the analyzed elements and the results of the
study of the evaluation of the risk factors, of the epidemiology surveillance
and related activities, as well as the quantitative estimation of the risk with
respect to the probability of introduction of the disease to the Mexican herd.
EVALUATED ELEMENTS:
Demography and characteristics of the Mexican cattle industry: Cattle is
one of the main activities in the Mexican farming sector, due to its
contribution in the supply of meat (beef) products, dairy, among others; as well
as its participation in the international trade on cattle exports, mainly to the
United States of North America.
According to data of the 2001, cattle population is of 30.620.933 of
heads, of which 28.480.803 are beef cattle and 2.140.130 dairy cattle. The main
cattle production states are located in the center-north, where its operation is
intensive and its feeding is based on grains; as well as in the coast of the
Gulf of Mexico and the south-southeastern, with intensive programs and feeding
is based mainly on the pasturing (grass). The national dairy herd, is calculated
as specialized or technified that represent 17,44% of the herd, semi-specialized
14,90% of the herd, double-purpose herd (beef and dairy) 59,68% and the small
family-run herd or the referred as “backyard” (traspatio) 7,98%.Previous numbers
are to be considered as an estimation of the dairy livestock inventory by
production units. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider that all races of
pure breed can be found in anyone of those groups.
Legal grounds: Mexico counts on a normative frame that covers (deals with)
the relevant aspects of the Epidemiology Surveillance of the BSE, like the
Federal Law of Animal Health, the Federal Law of Metrology and Regulation, the
General Law of Health and several Mexican Official Norms (NOM-009-Z00-1994,
Sanitary process of the meat, NOM-030-ZOO-1995, Specifications and procedures
for the import of beef, carcasses, viscera and offal at zoo-sanitary inspection
points, NOM-061-ZOO-1999, Zoo-sanitary specifications of nutritional products
destined for animal feed and NOM-060-ZOO-1999, Zoo-sanitary specifications for
the transformation of animals offal and its use in animal feeding). Wider and
extended covertures of these regulations were evaluated.
Veterinary infrastructure: The veterinary services in the country are
structural and normative organized by the Mexican State through the Secretariat
of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Affairs, Fishery and Alimentary (SAGARPA)
Federally Empower, that is to say, that has the capacity and authority to
negotiate an to come to agreement with the States Governments that integrate the
Republic; to coordinate itself with the other Secretariats of State; to deal
with organizations of the Private and Social sector as well as with the rest of
the Civil Society as a whole.
The National Service of Health, Food Safety and Ag-alimentary Quality
(SENASICA), it is an organism of this Secretariat, which has attributions in the
matter of vegetable health, animal health and ag-alimentary safety and is
conformed by the following main directorates: Sanidad Vegetal, Salud Animal,
Inocuidad Agroalimentaria, AcuĆcola y Pesquera, InspecciĆ³n Fitozoosanitaria,
(equivalent to U.S. APHIS, FSIS and VS –Veterinary Services) JurĆdica,
AdministraciĆ³n e InformĆ”tica. In accordance with the assigned attributions, it
corresponds to central offices the substantive part and the operative part, to
the personnel assigned to the State Delegations of the SAGARPA and other
instances of the SENASICA.
Consequently, the four main areas are assigned to the Main directorate of
Salud Animal-Animal Health (DGSA) and to the Main directorate of InspecciĆ³n
Fotozoosanitaria-Plant Inspection (DGIF) and Veterinary Services (SV) in Mexico
are in charge of: surveillance, epidemiology, animal movement, zoo-sanitary
campaigns and emergencies.
Imports This is perhaps one of the medullar points, in the sense that it
represents the information of the imports made during the risk periods and
therefore, it provides the fundamental information for the risk assessment. In
1991, Mexico implemented measures to avoid the appearance of BSE, as the disease
had become a serious worldwide problem, reason why, live bovines imports were
prohibited, beef, beef products and by-products and in 1994 flour of meat and
bone from countries affected by this disease was also prohibited and in the 2000
MBM feeding ban was imposed. In order to mitigate the risk of transmission of
the EEB, a revision of the established requirements for import for ruminants’
products began.
Cattle imports and its products and by-products, as well as specific risk
materials played a very important role in this study, where considerable amounts
of cattle imports from countries now affected by BSE were identified, countries
that at the time of the import they remained clean and therefore just some
preventive risk measures were in place.
Slaughter, Cattle disposition and Offal.- Different cattle slaughter
schemes were analyzed as well as the processes in use, finding some significant
differences among them, being the most important the sanitary jurisdiction of
the organizations that regulate us.
In Mexico, the slaughter is divided in three different systems, Federal
Inspection Type Plants (TIF), which has been increased in the past years; in
1992 they participated with the 13,5%, in 1997 with the 19,40% and in 2002 with
the 26,60% of the national total. In the case of the municipal slaughterhouses
from 1992 to 1997, their slaughtered animals corresponded to the 49,5% and for
2002 it was increased to 73,4%, whereas the slaughter in private plants
decreased of 37,10% in 1992 to 31,10%, in 1997 and from 1998 to date, we have no
information.
The procedures to be followed by the establishments in the animal
slaughter and those that industrialize, process, packing, chilled/froze beef
products or by-products for human consumption, in order to obtain products of
optimal hygienic quality, are written in the NOM-009-ZOO-1994 “sanitary Process
of Beef”.
The direct consumption of beef can be stratified in three great destinies,
differentiated by the market that are destined to, the rural one, the one of
small centers of population, (and) the one of the big cities, characterized each
one of them by its consumption and the partial or integral industrialization by
direct consumer and by means of commercialization or points of sale, as well as
for the origin of the own supplier.(?)
Rendering of Cattle Products.
The processes applied by the rendering plants for obtaining the protein
from inedible offal, were evaluated.
Food elaboration and its use for animal feeding.- This analysis was
focused in the processes of food elaboration for animal consumption.
In Mexico, the control in the production of food from animal origin, as
much as the elaboration of the meat flour as that of the balanced food
manufacture it is regulated by the Mexican Official Norm NOM-061-ZOO-1999,
“Zoo-sanitary Specifications of nutritional products for animal consumption”,
which bans the use of MBM flours of ruminant origin or any mixture that contains
it for the elaboration of balanced meals for ruminants, and the Mexican Official
Norm NOM-060-ZOO-1999, “Zoo-sanitary Specifications for the transformation of
animal offal and its use in the animal feeding”.
In accordance with the Section of Manufacturers of Balanced Food for
Animals of the National Camera of the Industry of Transformation (CANACINTRA),
there are 396 balanced food plants registered, same that have the capacity to
produce more than 20 million tons a year, according to the numbers registered
during 1999-2002. 63% of such plants are integrated and produce 64% of the
animal feed produced nationwide, the rest corresponds to commercial plants.
The animal feed produced by the integrated plants, that is the most
significant part, during the 2002 it produced the 58,7% of the products destined
for raising of poultry, the 16,5% for swine, the 14,3% for dairy and 9,2% for
feedlots (cattle) and 1,3% for other species.
As far as the composition of the main raw materials to produce balanced
foods, these mainly correspond in 45% to domestic sorghum and 55% sorghum
concentrated; 16% to domestic yellow maize and 84% imported; 91% domestic
protein pastes and 9% imported; 80% of other domestic forage grains (broken
maize, wheat, barley, oats, etc.) and 20% imported and other ingredients (wheat
by-products, maize, vitamins, minerals, oils, etc.).
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Neuropathies in Mexico, Epidemiology Surveillance Program.- For this
analysis, the legal elements related to the notification of the BSE were taken
into account, in Mexico, as well as the activities made by the Commission Mexico
- United States for the Prevention of the Aftosa Fever and Other Exotic Diseases
of Animals (CPA), official entity in charge of carrying out this activity and
other connected activities as training, taking of samples and the diagnosis of
laboratory.
BSE Diagnosis.
Veterinary Services diagnoses capacity was evaluated as well as its
adherence to the international standards, according to what is indicated by the
International Organization of Animal Health (OIE), as well as the processes of
taking and shipping of samples.
For the diagnosis of the BSE, the OIE recommends five laboratory tests:
Histopathology (HP), Immunohistochemistry (IHQ), Western blot
(immunotransferency), ELISA (enzimoinmunoassay) and Bio-assay in mouse. At this
time Mexico counts with two laboratories of diagnosis for this disease: the
National Center of Services of Diagnosis in Animal Health (CENASA) and the
Laboratory of high security of the CPA. The CENASA performs the histopathology
test and at the CPA the Immunohistochemistry test is carried out.
The reception of samples at CPA, it depends to a great extent on the
economic resources which are accounted for this activity, expense that is
approximately of $400,00 ($ 36.50 USD.) per sample received (includes the
material for conservation, packing and shipping), reason for what, have to wait
for the collection of several to be sent at the same time and in order to reduce
costs, but delaying the result. As the CPA does not have a certified pathologist
to carry-out the HP test technique, these samples are sent to the CENASA for
their diagnosis; this implies that such samples are stored by approximately one
week, since it doesn’t have the human resources for its transfer.
The main problem at CENASA, for the right operation of the diagnosis of
the BSE, it is the lack of coordination on shipping and receiving of samples,
which is not done accordingly to the calendar of the laboratory and the
operative area, because in a short period of time the expected/projected number
of samples is exceeded, resulting in delays in accomplishment of the tests and
the disposition in excess of material and human resources.
At this moment, the techniques are being standardized,
Immunohistochemistry at the CENASA and the western blot (immunmotransferency) at
the CPA, which will allow us to have more tools for the diagnose in Mexico; in
addition, the WB allow us to count on another technique of the higher
sensitivity and specificity, that guarantees optimal result in less time
(approximately 8 hours).
It must be mentioned that, we have had contemplated the formation of a
network of laboratories of diagnosis of TSE´s to specialized on the HP
technique, where we will have 6 regional laboratories and 4 universities
involved, this will in the future allow the processing and diagnosis of the
sample from its place of origin and only its confirmation by other techniques at
central level. For this, we already count with the procedure for the
authorization and verification of a laboratory of histopathology for the
diagnosis of the BSE.
Monetary Compensation to cattle dealers: Because the BSE is considered as
an exotic disease, a contingency fund that could be put to work in case the
disease appears, does not exist at this time.
In the case of the contingency funds, the national campaign for diseases
relies on a section on this subject. Nevertheless, for the exotic diseases
official norms do not exist and article 36 of the Federal Law of Animal Health
only establishes that will be due to create, but it does not explain the
mechanism to be considered for its creation.
The pre-established form to compensate the possible producers that are
themselves affected by the presence of BSE in their cattle, it will be from the
federal budget that is agreed upon the program Alliance for the Country for the
corresponding fiscal year.
In this sense, it is necessary to pinpoint that the minimum amount to
consider for this budget will be a 4% of the total assigned to the
Fito-zoo-sanitary Contingencies Plan on behalf of the Federal Government.
This will have a distribution by federal entity, which a specific amount
will be able to be assigned to joint, if necessary, to the DINESA against the
BSE. Also, the State Governments will proportionally contribute an equal amount
to the federal to be incorporated to the compensation funds of the Device of
Emergency. As for the cattlemen, they will have to come-up with resources
equivalent to the third part of the total amount assigned by the Federal and
State governments.
Animal identification and traceability of cattle products.- Different
elements were considered with which Mexico counts on to carry out the
traceability of animals and its products upon a sanitary problem, including the
animal identification and the organizations related to this activity.
Actually, the identification system of the cattle in Mexico is organized
in two forms, one State-ID with aims of demonstration of property and control of
cattle rustling and another Federal-ID, with aims of identification for the
development of the zoo-sanitary campaigns against the bovine tuberculosis and
brucellosis, first it is based on the registry and recognition of the Hot-Brands
of each producer, and the second in addition to the previous system, one is
based on a metallic earring of blue color with a number of identification, which
is described in the NOM-031-ZOO-1995, CampaƱa Nacional Contra la Tuberculosis
Bovina (Mycobacterium bovis), National Campaign Against Bovine Tuberculosis.
This procedure assigns a number to an animal, which is used during
zoo-sanitary surveillance campaigns, these activities are registered along with
an identification number, in a document called test-opinion, in which it is
written down, in addition to the test results applied to the animals, the
identification and data of the cattle herd and ranch of origin of the animal for
its later traceability. This test-opinion is along with the certificate of “Herd
free of bovine tuberculosis” as described in the same Mexican Official Norm.
According to the procedure previously described, in Mexico, there were
around 3.291 registered herds with 282.932 heads of bovines identified in 2003,
that represents 0,94% of the total population in this country.
Nevertheless, in the same NOM, it’s expressed in point 11 referring to
mobilization that the animals coming from disease-free herds, they will be able
to be mobilized to any destination within the national territory with no need to
be tested for tuberculosis before its mobilization, if the following
requirements are met: obtain a zoo-sanitary certificate, and for the
zoo-sanitary certificate to be issued, certification that they come from a
disease-free herd and that the animals must have a disease-free herd
identification.
Considering that in order to mobilize the animals it is necessary to have
a valid disease-free zoo-sanitary certificate, we can estimate that there are
more than 3,431,022 identified animals, according to the information obtained
from the Statistical Report of the Cattle Mobilization of FY2000, with
information captured up to the 24 of August of 2001 by the National Organism of
Herd Certification, A.C., that represents the 11,4% of the bovine total
population on which we can observe that more than 50% of these mobilizations are
directed to slaughterhouses, 17% to feedlots, 15% for export and 11% for
pasturing.
Based on the above, experience of a suitable animal traceability is shown
specially in the case of the animals destined to be exported, where the USDA
when finding a positive animal reactor to the tests of tuberculosis in the
United States, it has been possible to trace it back to its the original herd;
on the other hand, the identification system used on dairy cattle, which counts
on a homogenous system of identification for production and genetic improvement
control, nevertheless, this mechanism although is available for the federal
government, it would make use of, only in the presence of a serious epidemiology
event.
Educational Programs, Awareness and Training.- The CPA, one of its
activities, is to maintain a permanent program of training courses on exotic
diseases of the animals, on a national context. In 1994, BSE awareness programs
were incorporated , with the diffusion of information, talks and courses on the
following areas: disease history, economic consequences, etiology, transmission
mechanisms, clinical signage, histopathology injuries, differential diagnosis,
measures of prevention and activities of epidemiologist surveillance, supported
by audio-visual means, these programs are taken to a diverse audience, including
the students of the last semesters of Veterinary Medicine, to the personnel that
conforms the Quarantine National System, as well as Veterinary Doctors,
government, private and to other specialists.
ESTIMATION OF RISK (Risk Assessment)
According to the qualitative estimation in this assessment, it was
determined that the risk of occurrence of the disease in the bovine population,
is low.
The quantitative estimation index was located at 5.268908E 08 of the risk
of disease exposure of the national herd, number that represents numerically
like a low probability of occurrence of the problem in Mexico.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
The BSE is a disease that was described for the first time in 1986,
nevertheless, today, epidemiologists have many unanswered questions on how is
transmitted.
The introduction of the BSE in Mexico would cause a serious socioeconomic
impact, commercial, political and probably of public health concern, because the
presence of the disease would restrict sanitarily and commercially, disrupting
the actual distribution of meat products at national level and to other
countries, independently of the impact in the consumption of the inhabitants
with respect to the beef consumption and products of bovine origin.
Considering the way of transmission, in case of a breakout, the native
animals that are at greater risk of being infected in Mexico, those are the
dairy cattle in specialized systems and the bovines at feedlots in the arid and
tropical regions.
In Mexico, we got Laws, Mexican Official Norms and Agreements, that cover
relevant aspects of the epidemiology surveillance of the BSE, same that must be
fortified in its operative phase, mainly in its application and enforcement.
The Mexican Official Norm NOM-030-ZOO-1995, Specifications and procedures
for the import of beef, carcasses, viscera and offal at zoo-sanitary inspection
points, prohibits the import of cattle products, however, fresh beef has been
imported, chilled, frozen and beef preparations, as long as it comes from
animals smaller of thirty months of age, which diminishes the risk but does not
exclude it.
The evaluation showed that the four great areas of concern are assigned to
the Main Directorate of Animal Health (DGSA) and to the Main Directorate of
Fito-zoo-sanitary Inspection (DGIF); responsibility of the Veterinary Services
in Mexico, in relation to the BSE are: epidemiology surveillance, animal
movement control, zoo-sanitary campaigns and emergencies; functionality and
capability of communicating among them was evaluated as we as the capacity of
response before a sanitary emergency caused by the BSE.
It is necessary to increase and to better coordination of the surveillance
activities, particularity between the areas of diagnoses and operational, for
the correct execution of the surveillance activities in the field.
The imported bovines (1996-2003) have been slaughtered and those destined
to improve genetics, once they conclude their productive life and are discarded,
will also be slaughtered.
The actions of detection of downer-cows need to be reinforced for its
processing at TIF plants, till now a deficient activity, where the majority of
the animals with such clinical characteristics, regularly are not taken this
plants but rather are slaughtered at same ranch/location and consumed regionally
or they are taken to slaughterhouses without supervision and sanitary
inspection.
Ante mortem inspections need to be reinforced at Federal Inspection Type
Plants, municipal and private slaughterhouses, mainly in these two last ones,
with the purpose of detecting bovines clinically affected by BSE.
There is commercial interest to incorporate flours of meat and bone of
ruminants in the rations destined to the feeding of the bovines, like an
alternative source of protein matter, reason why official mechanisms must be
reinforced in preventing this type of illegal practices.
One of the tools in preventing the BSE is to avoid the exposure of the
native bovines to the consumption of presumably contaminated feed with the
pathological agent or unless is processed by means of a thermal process that
guarantees its inactivation. However, the heat treatment that the flours of meat
and bone are put under in XXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXX
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even though this one, it does not guarantee the destruction of the prion either,
but it reduces its infectivity significantly.
The Country counts on regulations, in respect to the transformation of
offal (NOM-061-ZOO-1999), there still are deficiencies as to the number and
qualification of the personnel responsible in supervising their fulfillment
through inspection and verification.
Deficiencies in the availability of technical information at official and
private levels were detected, crucial information necessary for the elaboration
of the present assessment, such as the case of the information on product
imports and on rendering plants, were not available for the study.
Blood was not considered as a potential source of transmission of the BSE,
by-product in form of flour (dry blood), that is also produced by the rendering
plants and is used in animals feeds.
The BSE epidemiology surveillance program in Mexico must be reinforced by
focusing on a target animal study (bovine suspected of BSE and with suggestive
clinical signs of the disease). On the other hand, as a result from this study,
we found that a percentage of the obtained samples for BSE testing have been
inadequately collected and among other causes were: absence of cerebral stem,
incomplete cerebral stem, over-manipulated samples, advanced changes (decompose)
postmortem, not enough tissue to work on, low concentration of conservative
(solution) or samples taken from inadequate age of animal (too young); showing
all of these, a necessity to review these procedures.
It was also detected the fact that, as a routine practice the samples sent
for the diagnosis of bovine rabies, whenever they come out positive to this
disease, they are no longer processed for the BSE testing, discarding with this,
the possibility of finding both diseases in a same animal, rabies virus and the
BSE prion. It is also concluded that with the loss of diagnosis material, it
prevented us from obtaining valuable epidemiology information useful in
restructuring our surveillance program.
The identification of the cattle, as well as the traceability of its
products and by-products, presents serious deficiencies at national level, which
is important in case the BSE is detected in the Country, given its importance
like a primordial component to trace, to prevent and to eradicate this and other
animal diseases, turning out to be an additional vital tool to determine the
dissemination degree in case of break-out in the country, that would immediately
allow us to be able to establish its origin (native or imported) and to take the
appropriate counter-epidemic measures.
From 1994, the Commission Mexico - United States for the Prevention of
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) and other Exotic Diseases (CPA), it has carried out
activities of awareness and training on BSE, however, this has been centered to
certain zones of the country, leaving some other zones, particularly the rural
zones without cover, same that can provide with valuable epidemiology
information and some cases for diagnosis of neuropathy in ruminants.
According to the analysis made on the risk assessment in its qualitative
modality, it is considered like low-risk, the risk of introduction of the BSE to
the national herd, whereas the quantitative study locates it in values of
5.268908E-08.
Recommendations:
We ought:
to reinforce the inspection and supervision activities by the sanitary
authority of the SAGARPA over all of those involved in the cattle production
chain, in respect to the fulfillment and application of the established
technical regulations expressed on the official norms on the monitoring of BSE,
specially the NOM-060-ZOO-1999, Zoo-sanitary specifications for the
transformation of animals offal and its use in animal feeding and the
NOM-061-ZOO-1999, Zoo-sanitary specifications of nutritional products for animal
consumption;
to increase the number of inspectors (Vet Doctors) as much as governmental
as private, with a vision of having a better supervision of the rendering plants
and feed factories. It is recommendable that such inspectors have a veterinary
doctor’s degree.
to reinforce the active epidemiology surveillance subsystem, having
special attention to aim at target animals and the size of the statistical test,
as well as its stratification at national level;
to review, to update and to homologate the criteria and definitions of the
Mexican official norms related to the monitoring of the BSE and the requirements
of import, according to norms NOM-008, NOM-030 and NOM-060;
to provide technical and legal elements in the official norms, that may
allow to optimize the use of financial and human resources (federal, state and
private), with the purpose of that the material and human infrastructure, the
installed diagnoses and the potential, can be used with greater efficiency, in
the prevention activities, diagnosis and surveillance of the BSE in Mexico;
to homologate the mechanism of training in the obtaining of the samples
for the BSE, using the technique of the teaspoon, by means of a national
program;
to have a certified pathologist for the high security laboratory of the
CPA, because this situation of not having one, causes the delay in the
processing of samples, as well as the loss of economic resources by requiring
the support of the CENASA;
to plan the taking of samples at a national level and to coordinate its
shipment to the CPA for its processing in the laboratory of high security or its
re-expedition to the CENASA, with the purpose of optimizing the diagnosis;
to obtain funds and allocate them at each state, in order to compensate
cattle dealers affected by the animal culling at risk by BSE, in case of BSE
showing up in Mexico, the same or similar mechanism are to established for the
handling of monetary compensation, like the one used on the Alliance for the
Country or to extend the already existing state government faculties, by means
of an exclusive and specific account for the implementation of BSE comp payment.
to implement a national animal identification and traceability system, its
products and by-products, that it may allow us to apply prevention measures and
control of diseases, as it would be the case of the BSE.
With foundation in Article 14, fraction VI, of the Federal Law of
Transparency and Access to the Governmental Public Information, the following
paragraphs have been blocked:
Justification of the blockade (p. 6, paragraph 1):
Gallinaza and pollinaza- feather meal (hay bed or substrate on which birds
grow up, constituted by rice husk, straw or another type of hay, agriculturist,
that at the end of the raising cycle of young hens or chicken, contains the
feces of the animals that were bred on it, as well as rest of non-consumed food
by the birds), it has been considered in multiple occasions, like an element of
potential risk in the transmission of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), when it is used to feed ruminants. The risk is generated, as it is
common, the bird feed, contains flours of meat and bone of ruminant like source
of protein. In this way, in theory, if some of the bovines with which the meat
and bone flour was prepared as bird feed were infected with the BSE prion and
given the high resistance of the agent (prion) to high temperatures, in the
industrial process as the making of the flour, like the making of the
nutritional concentrated feed for birds, and even the passage by digestive-tract
of the bird, it would not guarantee the destruction of the BSE prion, reason why
the possibility would exist, when gallinaza or pollinaza is used in the feeding
of ruminants, this could infect susceptible ruminants.
With foundation in Article 14, fraction VI, of the Federal Law of
Transparency and Access to the Governmental Public Information, the following
paragraphs have been blocked:
Justification of the blockade (p. 6, paragraph 2):
As much gallinaza as pollinaza, they can contain up to a 3% of wasted
food, independently of bird feces that could also contain the prion, all
implying that the flours of meat and bone of bovine origin, can be consumed by
other bovines and by doing this, constituting a possible situation of BSE risk.
Norma NOM-060-ZOO-1999 Zoo-sanitary specifications for the transformation
of animal’s offal and its use in animal feeding and the NOM-061-ZOO-1999
Zoo-sanitary Specifications of nutritional products for animal consumption, they
clearly indicate the prohibition to feed ruminants with flours of meat and bone
of ruminant origin, however, the prohibition to feed ruminants with gallinaza or
pollinaza, is not contemplated in these norms.
With foundation in Article 14, fraction VI, of the Federal Law of
Transparency and Access to the Governmental Public Information, the following
paragraphs have been blocked:
Justification of the blockade (p. 6, paragraph 3):
Other elements to consider are the production cycles of the farms of birds
in Mexico, a common practice is that when a cycle is reached (ended) “all
inside, all outside”, and the pollinaza and gallinaza are destined to feed the
cattle. Depending on the type and the characteristics of the bed, it is possible
to calculate an approximated weight of 13,9 kg. by square meter of bird farm
surface.
With foundation in Article 14, fraction VI, of the Federal Law of
Transparency and Access to the Governmental Public Information, the following
paragraphs have been blocked:
Justification of the blockade (p. 6, paragraph 4):
In the Mexican market, two types of products are accepted: pollinaza and
gallinaza, which has been consolidated as a production system, considering that
near 90% of the feces are used as ruminant’s feed, with prices reaching near
those of cereal grains, the rest is used in agriculture.
With foundation in Article 14, fraction VI, of the Federal Law of
Transparency and Access to the Governmental Public Information, the following
paragraphs have been blocked:
Justification of the blockade (p. 6, paragraph 5):
The use of the animal feces like source of high nutrients supply, it obeys
mainly to its high content of mineral matter and non-protein nitrogen. In
general, nitrogen is concentrated in greater amount in bird feces. What is
doubtless, it is that the feces are raw material available all the year long for
animal feeding, especially bovines.
The FAO (1980) made a description of the physical composition of pollinaza
as it is detailed next:
Feces 62%
Bed 31%
Wasted Feed 3%
Feathers 2%
Unknown ingredients related to fresh matter 2%
Source: The FAO. Feed from Wastes Animal: State of knowledge, Production
animal and Health, to paper 18. Rome, Italy 1980.
Conclusion:
Making public the information that has been eliminated of the report, it
would open the door for those in the grain business to use it for their benefit
and by pressing the government/the authority to establish a NOM banning such
products as ruminant feed. This would bring/cause an important alteration in the
commercialization of these products nationwide, which in turn would remarkably
increase the production costs of the cattle in feed lots. Today, we foresee
escalating grains prices at medium term, originated by its use in the ethanol
production; this would aggravate the situation and force a NOM as described
before, which in addition, if our sanitary status with respect to the BSE is
considered low, it would be obviously excessive cost and highly harmful for the
producer of birds and cattle. It is why, that it was decided to block the
reference information.
With foundation in Article 14, fraction VI, of the Federal Law of
Transparency and Access to the Governmental Public Information, the following
paragraphs have been blocked:
Justification of the blockade (p. 12, paragraph 3):
During the period between 1996 to 2003 years in which, considering the
long period of incubation of the BSE, the disease was already present in the
United States of America and Canada, Mexico as usual, imported considerable
amounts of calves destined for dairy production. In the same term “bullfight”
bulls from Spain were imported once Europe reached a free status from FMD, same
that allowed the import of some cattle for reproduction from other European
countries, with exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland, countries in which
BSE already existed.
In all the cases these imports were immediately stopped even before the
confirmation of BSE in those countries, nevertheless, as already indicated, the
ample period of incubation of the disease, those imports are looked as of
certain risk, even though in that moment they were not.
The nonexistence of a national animal identification and traceability
system at that time made it impossible to establish the destiny of most of those
animals and to even know if they have been eliminated at the end of its
productive life. It is possible to indicate that the recent imports of heifers
coming from the United States of America and in the near future from Canada, new
requirements and actions that guarantee their traceability and other measures to
mitigate the BSE risk, are in place.
Even though during the administration of the Lic. Vicente Fox, the SAGARPA
made a concerted effort to establish the National System of Individual Cattle
Identification (SINIIGA), the magnitude, cost and coverage of the project, its
conclusion in the short and medium term are way far distant, what implies that
it will be long time before Mexico can count on a suitable (working) national
system of identification and traceability of animals and products of origin
animal.
The blockade of the above paragraph obeys to the convenience of not
exposing to the Federal Government to unnecessarily critics that even though
funded, it would not contribute to the solution of a problem that, although is
of urgent attention, by its magnitude and cost, it exceeds in much, the present
capacities as much of the Government, like of the National Cattlemen Sector. The
critic would sustain in that what it is said in such paragraph is purely
speculative, without possibility of corroborating it documentarily.
END...
Hola Amigo Terry,
Finally, here is a translation - if you can call it that - i'm not happy
with it but guess that some paragraphs are very literally translated (poorest
job i have ever done translating a document), please read it and if something is
not clear enough or not right just let me know it and i'll correct it...
If you don't find anything of importance; if it is to vague and shows that
they have done nothing about it; if somehow it gives you the impresion that they
don't know a thing and are trying to cover their butts in a very stupid
way;...yea! you got the right impression!!
All they are saying it's a "mea culpa" and we ought to do this and that;
we don't know how they came in or where they are; we are looking into it; we
screwed up all the BSE testing and we don't know how to do it right; it is too
costly and we don't have the money; we didn't do it, past administration did it;
we are trying to fix it; etc.,
All of the above and more, but we are following OIE rules, we have NO BSE
anywhere and risk is extremely low or null, but CATTLEMEN WIL BE COMPENSATED!!
Conclusion- they are a bunch of murderers and me a national security
threat for having them to admit it!! .....Oh my Lord!
snip...end (tss)
Have a wonderful weekend and our best regards,
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
=======================================
BSE MAD COW IN MEXICO ???
MEXICO CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE CJD
CANADA
Saturday, February 28, 2015
BSE CANADA UPDATE Transcript - Technical Briefing to Provide an Update on
Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alberta February 27, 2015
4:00 p.m.
Saturday, February 14, 2015
Canadian Food Inspection Agency Confirms Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in Alberta
EDMONTON - Some of former Alberta premier Ralph Klein's most colourful
quotes — and the reactions they elicited:
SNIP...
"This all came about through the discovery of a single, isolated case of
mad cow disease in one Alberta cow on May 20th. The farmer — I think he was a
Louisiana fish farmer who knew nothing about cattle ranching. I guess any
self-respecting rancher would have shot, shovelled and shut up, but he didn't do
that." — Klein recalls how the mad cow crisis started and rancher Marwyn
Peaster's role. The premier was speaking at the Western Governors Association
meeting in Big Sky, Mont. September 2004.
"The premier meant that in an ironic or almost a sarcastic way." — Klein
spokesman Gordon Turtle.
---
"You would have to eat 10 billion meals of brains, spinal cords, ganglia,
eyeballs and tonsils." — Klein speaking in Montreal in January 2005 on the risk
of humans contracting mad cow disease.
---
"I would offer $5 billion to have a Japanese person to come over here and
eat nothing but Alberta beef for a year. And if he gets mad cow disease, I would
be glad to give him $5 billion — make it $10 billion — Canadian." — Klein
speaking after Japan closed its borders to Canadian beef.
---
Thursday, February 10, 2011
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011
and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA
Thursday, August 19, 2010
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA
Friday, March 4, 2011
Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease
Tuesday, May 21, 2013
Canada, USA, Bad feed, mad cows: Why we know three BSE cases had a common
origin and why the SSS policy is in full force $$$
Increased Atypical Scrapie Detections
Press reports indicate that increased surveillance is catching what
otherwise would have been unreported findings of atypical scrapie in sheep. In
2009, five new cases have been reported in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and
Saskatchewan. With the exception of Quebec, all cases have been diagnosed as
being the atypical form found in older animals. Canada encourages producers to
join its voluntary surveillance program in order to gain scrapie-free status.
The World Animal Health will not classify Canada as scrapie-free until no new
cases are reported for seven years. The Canadian Sheep Federation is calling on
the government to fund a wider surveillance program in order to establish the
level of prevalence prior to setting an eradication date. Besides long-term
testing, industry is calling for a compensation program for farmers who report
unusual deaths in their flocks.
Current as of: 2015-01-31
Sheep flocks and/or goat herds confirmed to be infected with classical
scrapie in Canada in 2015 Date confirmed Location Animal type infected January 5
Ontario Goat
Tuesday, February 10, 2015
Alberta Canada First case of chronic wasting disease found in farm elk
since 2002
Saturday, January 31, 2015
RAPID ADVICE 17-2014 : Evaluation of the risk for public health of casings
in countries with a “negligible risk status for BSE” and on the risk of
modification of the list of specified risk materials (SRM) with regard to BSE
CANADA SEE STEADY INCREASE OF THE SPORADIC CJD’S AND THE VPSPR’S (sporadic
CJD’s). ...tss
PLEASE NOTE, type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD)
in Canada is also on a steady increase.
please see ;
> 3. Final classification of 50 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is
pending.
CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20122
As of May 31, 2012
Deaths of Definite and Probable CJD
Year Sporadic Iatrogenic Familial GSS FFI vCJD Total
1994 2 0 0 1 0 0 3
1995 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
1996 13 0 0 0 0 0 13
1997 16 0 1 1 0 0 18
1998 22 1 0 1 0 0 24
1999 26 2 2 1 0 0 31
2000 32 0 0 3 0 0 35
2001 27 0 2 1 0 0 30
2002 31 0 2 2 0 1 36
2003 27 1 1 0 0 0 29
2004 42 0 1 0 0 0 43
2005 42 0 0 2 0 0 44
2006 39 0 1 3 1 0 44
2007 35 0 0 4 0 0 39
2008 48 0 1 0 0 0 49
2009 48 0 3 2 0 0 53
2010 34 0 3 0 0 0 37
2011 37 0 2 1 0 1 41
2012 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 525 4 19 22 1 2 573
1. CJDSS began in 1998
2. Data before 1998 are retrospective and partial, data from 1998 to 2008
are complete, and data for 2009 - 2012 are provisional
3. Final classification of 50 cases from 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is
pending.
CJD Deaths Reported by CJDSS1, 1994-20122
As of May 31, 2012
SEE DECEMBER 2012 CANADA
Saturday, June 15, 2013
Canada Fraser Health Statement on Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease outbreak
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European ***
Monday, November 3, 2014
USA CJD TSE PRION UNIT, TEXAS, SURVEILLANCE UPDATE NOVEMBER 2014
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1
(October 7, 2014)
***6 Includes 11 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 19
inconclusive cases;
***7 Includes 12 (11 from 2014) cases with type determination pending in
which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.
***The sporadic cases include 2660 cases of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease (sCJD),
***50 cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr)
***and 21 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI).
Thursday, January 15, 2015
41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE
Prion: Case Report
Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies
diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type
disease
what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the
public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.
why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping
everything the USDA inc says.
sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and
there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.
My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky
Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.
with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you
Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the
Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am
seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years
and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or
what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other
meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how
many bodies is this market worth?
Saturday, January 17, 2015
*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed
with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
*** ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report ***
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
Towards an Age-Dependent Transmission Model of Acquired and Sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Thursday, January 22, 2015
Transmission properties of atypical Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a clue to
disease etiology?
the ukbsenvcjd only theory was wrong...always has been$$$, in my
opinion...tss
Saturday, May 09, 2015
*** Psychiatric Symptoms in Patients With Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease in Germany ***
Sunday, July 06, 2014
Dietary Risk Factors for Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: A Confirmatory
Case-Control Study
Conclusions—The a priori hypotheses were supported.
*Consumption of various meat products may be one method of transmission of
the infectious agent for sCJD.
PLEASE REMEMBER ;
The Akron, Ohio-based CJD Foundation said the Center for Disease Control
revised that number in October of 2004 to about one in 9,000 CJD cases per year
in the population group age 55 and older.
HAVE YOU GOT YOUR CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ASKING REAL QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO
ROUTE AND SOURCE OF THE TSE AGENT THAT KILLED YOUR LOVED ONE ???
if not, why not...
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
Friday, January 10, 2014
vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type
prion disease, what it ???
Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential
Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease
Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3,
2014
Singeltary comment ;
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14,
2001 JAMA
snip...
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee TSEAC MEETING
SCHEDULED FOR June 1, 2015
*** PRION 2015 CONFERENCE FORT COLLINS***
***PLEASE NOTE, one of the most Prominent Transmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathy PRION disease Scientist in the world, that was on this board,
recently resigned do to the fact that the PRION 2015 conference oral abstracts,
and poster abstracts, are now NOT available to the public, only pay-per-view.
this was a terrible loss not only to this board, but to the scientific community
tse prion world. ...tss
Wednesday May 27
14:45 Jean-Phillipe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission, France,
Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation
periods:
* IMPLICATIONS FOR BSE AND SCRAPIE RISK ASSESSMENT IN HUMAN
POPULATIONS.
16:45Quingzhong Kong Case Western Reserve University
Zoonotic Potential of CWD
Prions
Sunday, May 3, 2015
PRION2015 FORT COLLINS
PRION 2015 all pay per view now PRION20?? this is terrible. I’m sad. pay
per view now on the TSE Prion conferences $ how can I keep up?
Prion 2015
Poster AbstractsPurchase optionsPrice
*( ) Issue PurchaseUSD 189.00
( ) Article PurchaseUSD 48.00
Prion 2015 Oral Abstracts
Purchase optionsPrice
*( ) Issue PurchaseUSD 189.00
( ) Article PurchaseUSD 48.00
Sunday, May 3, 2015
*** PRION2015 FORT COLLINS ***
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net